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A Tale of Two Opinions: The Meaning of 
Statutes and the Nature of Judicial 
Decision-making in the Administrative Context 
Katherine L. Vaughns* 
After a long period of relative neglect, the subject of statutory 
interpretation once again enjoys favor in the courts of 
academic discourse? 
The rise of the administrative state ignited an ongoing 
debate on the role of the judiciary in interpreting statutes. 
Professor Vaughns examines the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Abourezk v. Reagan, interpreting a politically- 
charged statutory provision in  a decision from the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, often characterized as  
one of the more ideologically polarized courts in the country. 
Although both opinions follow t h e  methodological 
decision-making mandated by the Supreme Court's landmark 
case of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, they 
nonetheless reach sharply contrary, result-oriented outcomes. 
Meanwhile modem commentators have advanced more 
sophisticated statutory interpretive theories to update 
outmoded statutes and to encourage more judicial candor. 
Abourezk thus provides an excellent vehicle for showing how 
other interpretive methods play out in the context of a complex 
case. Abourezk also illustrates how even the seemingly easy to 
apply agency deference required by Chevron can be judicially 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I 
would like to express my sincere appreciation to colleagues Bill Reynolds and 
David Bogen for their invaluable contributions and helpful suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this article and to Vidor Tervala, my research assistant on earlier 
versions of this piece, whose contribution to this project was first-rate. I am also 
grateful to Dean Donald G. Gifford for his fmancial support of this project. Any 
errors are my own. 
1. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
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manipulated to satisfy individual agendas. Finally, Abourezk 
reveals the heavy social costs that may result from a lack of 
judicial candor. 
The American legal system has moved rapidly from a 
system of case law to one dominated by statutes applied by 
agencies to control all aspects of our lives. Because many 
statutory delegations to agencies occur at a high level of 
generality, judges possess a good degree of maneuverability in 
deciding how to apply the law. In order to cabin judicial 
discretion and achieve congressional mandates, both candor 
and sophisticated statutory analysis must be used in decision- 
making. In this article I examine one case in which both 
qualities are lacking. Through a detailed analysis of the case, I 
hope to shed some light on a highly controversial substantive 
area2 and to provide an example of how to analyze difficult 
problems of interpretation3 in the administrative context. In 
the process, I hope to encourage students of statutory 
interpretation to set aside discussions of abstract linguistics4 
and easy examples5 and urge them t o  consider diffcult real 
world problems. Finally, I consider the role judicial candor 
plays in statutory interpretation. 
2. The case selected for discussion in this article involves the interpretation 
of a statutory provision of the Immigration and Nationality Ad. Commentators 
have variously described immigration law as "a constitutional oddity" and a "wild 
card." Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and The Principle of 
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 with Peter H. Schuck, 
The IC2.ansformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
3. Heretofore, "[sltatutory construction has been the backwater of legal 
theory." Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory 
Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 59 (1988). Today, however, 
"[a]cademic ferment concerning 'interpretation' has clearly reached the 'heady brew' 
stage." Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 827 (1991). 
4. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 
(1892). The Court in that case refused to follow the language of the statute, 
declaring that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the . . . intention of its makers." Id. at 459. Also, "[sltatutes are not exercises in 
private language. They should be read, like a contractual offer, to find their 
reasonable import." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 60. The instant case provides 
such an example with the "mere presence or entry" versus "activities" dichotomy 
discussed infra. 
5. The stock examples are "vehicles in the park" and "letting blood in the 
streets of Bologna." See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 540, 543 
(1988). 
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The case selected for this examination involves the 
interpretation of a statutory provision in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952,~ as amended ("INK),' involving the 
exclusion of aliens8 from entry into the United States.' 
Although the provision at issue has subsequently been 
amended to eliminate the specific interpretive question the 
court addressed, the recent amendment itself raises intriguing 
questions for the various theories of statutory interpretation 
that currently dominate the field.'' Specifically, would any of 
the modern statutory approaches advanced by legal scholars 
have remedied the concerns that were eventually resolved 
through the legislative process? In other words, which of the 
theories, if any, that focus on statutory interpretation as 
evolutionary, would have best served the cause of the 
legislative resolution ultimately fashioned by Congress? And 
what of judicial candor? Would it have informed the legislative 
process as well? 
11. THE SUBJECT OF THE INTERPRETNE INQUIRY 
This article thus critically examines the jurisprudence of 
two judges in a single case--Abourezk v. Reagan;" one judge 
strains to avoid applying the rule of law while the other strains 
to  apply it. Judge Ginsburg for the majority temporarily 
avoided the aliens' outright exclusion by remanding the case for 
irrelevant information, while Judge Bork, in dissent, affirmed 
their exclusion by selective reliance on legislative history.12 
6. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C. & 50 U.S.C. app.). 
7. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). For a summary of United 
States immigration law see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AM) POLICY: 1952-1979 (1979). The INA is a 
comprehensive statute which regulates U.S. immigration laws. For a description of 
developments and proposals leading up to the passage of the INA see EDWARD P. 
HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, 
251-313 (1981). 
8. The word "alien" is a term of art in immigration law and is not intended 
to be derogatory or disparaging. Under the INA, the term "alien" means any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States. INA 8 101(a)(3) (1992). The 
term "national" means a person owing permanent allegiance to a nation state. INA 
5 lOl(aX21) (1992). 
9. More specifically, 8 212(a) of the INA lists all current classes of 
excludable aliens. 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
lo. See INA 8 212(aX3XC) (1991) and infia notes 216-28 and accompanying 
text. 
11. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
12. Then Court of Appeals Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored the majority 
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Abourezk was selected because of the controversy it highlights 
and because it fits the paradigm case described by Professor 
Diver: a case "where a legislature entrusted the administration 
of a statute to an agency, subject to judicial review."13 With 
the delegation of authority to executive agencies to enforce and 
implement the statute that Congress has charged them to 
administer, those agencies have the first opportunity to pass on 
the interpretive issue which is later presented to a court. 
Thus the "Age of Statutes" has "significantly altered the 
ground rules" of statutory interpretation.14 Judges now must 
share their interpretive functions with officials in the executive 
branch of govern~nent,'~ which is not a natural task for some. 
This is particularly true in certain areas of the law such as 
immigration law. Long considered "a maverick . . . in our public 
law,"16 immigration is an area of law in which the role of the 
judiciary is considered rather circumspect. In fact, "no other 
area of American law has been so radically insulated and 
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional 
right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate 
the rest of our legal system."17 
These statements exemplify the tension inherent in the 
judicial process when judges confront issues in immigration 
law. The discord arises because the power of the sovereign over 
immigration is plenary," a power so great that it permits 
Congress to  "regularly make[] rules that would be unacceptable 
if applied to  citizens."lg Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
opinion. The dissenting jurist, Judge Robert H. Bork, now resigned from the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, was the center of controversy when 
his Supreme Court nomination was blocked in late 1987 by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
13. Diver, supra note 1, at 580. 
14. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. 
L.J. 353, 395-96 (1989). 
15. Id. at 395. 
16. Schuck, supra note 2, at 1. 
17. Id. 
18. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have 
no counterpart in the federal government's power to regulate the conduct of its 
own citizens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81  (1976). See, e.g., Lees v. United 
States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (congressional exclusionary power is "absolute" 
and "not open to challenge in the courts"); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (''conclusive upon the judiciary"). 
19. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80. For commentary that challenges the continued 
viability of the plenary power doctrine, see, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545 (1990); Schuck, supra note 2; 
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repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the 
admission (and conversely the exclusion) of aliens.20 
Supreme Court precedent "[has] long recognized the power 
to  expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government's political departments largely 
immune from judicial control."21 Well-established case law 
requires judges to defer to  agency determinations and statutes 
in this area.22 The formal role of the judiciary, therefore, is 
quite limited. But a limited judicial role, of course, can lead to 
an "unjust" result in individual cases, a perception that often 
places temptation before the judi~iary .~ 
That temptation often leads judges astray, causing them to 
stretch the correct result while maintaining the formal require- 
ments of our legal system. These rulings can be made to 
appear, at least on their face, consistent with established 
precedent. Examined more closely, however, the ruling can be 
seen as a subterfuge for not deciding the case as precedent 
would dictate. Judges who write such opinions have, in effect, 
substituted their own judgment for that of the agency, 
Congress, or higher courts." Such action, of course, flies 
squarely in the face of Supreme Court mandates as well as 
established notions of acceptable judicial behavior. 
Abourezk involves a statutory provision that relates to the 
government's denial of nonimmigrant (temporary visitors) visas 
based on ideological and national interests (i.e., political) 
Legomsky, supra note 2. 
20. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), 
quoted approvingly in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). 
21. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). 
22. E.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 US. 139, 145 (1981); see also, e.g., Fiallo 
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (power "largely immune" from judicial review). 
But see id. at 793 n.5 (accepting a "limited" judicial responsibility to review even 
those congressional decisions concerning the exclusion of aliens). 
23. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 112-23 (1992) (explaining the choice between 
jurists favoring rules (a more restrictive approach) and jurists favoring standards (a 
more flexible approach) as differing on the basis of their conceptions of the judicial 
role). "But particular choices between rules and standards take place in specific 
political contexts, and, in those contexts, take account of the substance they will 
govern." Id. at  123. 
24. See, e.g., Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at  144 (stating that courts may not 
overturn an agency construction of a discretionary standard "simply because [they] 
may prefer another interpretation of the statute"). 
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grounds of exclu~ion,2~ the latter ground being a matter that 
implicates "the conduct of foreign relations" that is "so 
exclusively entrusted to  the political branches of government as 
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.'" 
The case also involves the application of the analytical 
framework that the Supreme Court articulated in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, I~c." for 
the interpretation of administrative statutes that mandates 
agency deference in appropriate cases. 
The Department of State (DOS), the executive branch 
agency accorded documentation responsibilities under the INA 
for such authority as the issuance of travel gave the 
statute an unnatural c o n s t r u ~ t i o n ~ ~  that  was not 
contemplated by the Congress that drafted it.30 The DOS 
interpretation also ran counter to modern social concerns 
evinced in international treaties and related  statute^.^' The 
statute was subsequently amended to ameliorate the earlier 
25. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd per 
curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
26. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
27. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
28. Ordinarily, the DOS's responsibilities lie in the field of foreign relations. 
Nevertheless, it is one of five major federal agencies involved in the immigration 
process. 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). Although it has a secondary role in administering 
the immigration laws, compare 8 U.S.C. 8 1103(a) with id. $8 1104(a) and 1201, 
the DOS plays a primary role in visa issuance because visa applications are 
usually handled by consulate officials abroad. A foreign national intending to visit 
this country must, therefore, Ne a visa application at a United States consulate or 
embassy in his or her homeland before traveling to this country. 
For a more complete description of the DOS's role in the issuance of 
immigration visas, see generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MAI~TIN, 
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 115-17 (2d ed. 1991). 
29. The construction of the provision in question was unnatural because a 
literal definition of "activities" is far more restrictive than the connotations of 
terms like "mere presence* or "entry" proffered by the government. 
30. See Kenneth D. Greenwald, Comment, Abourezk v. Reagan: The Need for 
Further Clarification and Reform of Alien Excludability Law, 77 GEO. L.J. 217, 227 
(1988) (describing congressional intent behind the provision as unclear at  best but 
acknowledging that no evidence existed to indicate that Congress ever "directly 
addressed" the issue in question). 
31. See, e.g., Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution 
of a Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1987) (tracing the history of the ideological and 
national interest exclusion provisions enacted in 1952 to the legislative and social 
currents set in motion as early as the colonial period); Deborah L. Zimic, Note, 
National Security Visa Denials: Delimiting the Exercise of Executive Exclusion 
Authorib Under the Immigration and Nationalib Act, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 711 (1988) 
(examining the proposed reform measures designed to conform the national security 
exclusion grounds to address current political and social reality concerns); see also 
infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation. Admittedly, under several traditional and 
modern methods of statutory interpretation, the agency 
decision was not entirely justified. On the other hand, the 
statutory language in question is very broad and sweeping in 
scope, and the DOS acted in an area of broad executive 
discretion pursuant to a statute designed to  protect national 
interests. Further, the agency's interpretation was 
linguistically possible and not clearly precluded by the 
statutory provision's legislative history or the subsequent 
legislative history of a related provision. Finally, the DOS is 
generally concerned with matters having foreign policy 
implications." 
A. Abourezk v. Reagan: Facts and Background 
Abourezk v. Reagan involved the denial of visas to  four 
foreign  national^?^ Each foreign national had applied for a 
visa at an American consulate or embassy abroad? The con- 
sular officers originally denied the visas on ideological grounds 
to  which a possible statutory waiver would have applied.35 
But because all of the applications involved possible denials for 
foreign policy reasons under the national interest (or national 
security) ground of exclusion for which no waiver was possible, 
they were forwarded to DOS officials in Washington, D.C. for 
review in accordance with standing operational instr~ctions.~~ 
- -  - - 
32. Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain 
Meaning Of Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 449 
(1993). 
33. The initial controversy involved the consolidation of three actions, contest- 
ing the DOS's denial under INA $ 212(a)(27) of nonimmigrant visas to four foreign 
nationals whose names and affiliations appear in parentheses: Abourezk v. Reagan, 
No. 83-3739 (Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's Minister of the Interior); City of New York 
v. Baker, No. 83-3741 (Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, members of the 
Federation of Cuban Women); and Cronin v. Baker, No. 83-3895 (Nino Pasti, for- 
mer member of the Italian Senate and participant in activities of the World Peace 
Council). Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984). 
34. With exceptions not relevant here, no alien may enter the United States 
without first having applied for and obtained an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa. 
See 8 U.S.C. $0 118l(a), 1182(aX26) (Supp. V 1993). 
35. A discretionary waiver of excludability based on the ideological ground 
(subsection 28) could have been conferred by the Attorney General, but no such 
waiver was available for exclusion under the national interest ground (subsection 
27). 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(d)(3) (1982). 
36. "Applications for nonimmigrant visas do not typically raise foreign policy 
concerns." Government's Brief at  6 31.2, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
Between 1963 and 1983, consular officers issued nearly 70 million nonimmigrant 
visas and denied (on foreign policy or internal security grounds) only 519 applica- 
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Originally, three of the four denials were based on former 
INA 5 212(a)(28)f7 ultimately, however, all four were based 
on former INA 5 212(a)(27)?~ Subsection 28, generally re- 
ferred to as the "ideological" ground, was more specific in scope, 
and barred admission to aliens who advocated, or were mem- 
bers of organizations that advocated, anarchistic, communist, 
or totalitarian ideology, or otherwise advocated the overthrow 
of the United States g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  Subsection 27, generally 
labelled the "national interests" ground, broadly barred entry to 
any alien who sought "to enter the United States solely, princi- 
pally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be 
prejudicial to the public interest or endanger the welfare, 
safety or security of the United States.'"' 
In each case, DOS officials in Washington recommended 
the denial of the visas on the ground that admission would be 
prejudicial to U.S. foreign policy interests. Specifically, DOS 
concluded that the foreign nationals9 visits to the United States 
were not as private citizens of their respective countries but as 
official representatives of their countries9 governments as part 
of official efforts to disrupt American foreign policy, with the 
exception of Nino Pasti whom the government considered to be 
an  emissary of an instrumentality for the former Soviet govern- 
tions under subsection 27. Id. During the period from 1981 through 1983, six to 
seven million nonimmigrant visas had been granted annually and an average of 
less than 30 were denied under subsection 27. Id. (citing statement of Joan M. 
Clark, Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 198.3: Hearing on H.R. 4509 and 
H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refkgees, and International Law of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1984); BUREAU OF 
CONSULAR FFAIRS, REPORTS OF THE VISA OFFICE (MS-1980, 1981, 1982)). 
The DOS, however, provides special guidance to its consular officers whenever 
visa applications raise national security or foreign policy concerns. Id. at 7. Such 
cases must be referred to the Department for an advisory opinion. Furthermore, 
advisory opinions are required when a consular officer has reason to believe that 
an applicant may be ineligible under subsection 2l2(a)(27). Id. (citing 9 DEPART- 
MENT OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, Pt. 11, $ 41.91(a)(27) (1975) [Foreign 
Affairs Manual, vol. 9 (Visa TI-880, '11 I)]). 
37. INA, ch. 477, $ 212(aX28), 66 Stat. 163, 184-86 (1952) (codified as amend- 
ed at 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(aX28) (1982)). 
38. INA, ch. 477, $ 2l2(a)(27), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (codified as amended 
at  8 U.S.C. $ 1182(a)(27) (1982)). Unlike section 212(a)(28) of the Act, the Attorney 
General could not have waived section 212(a)(27) to permit their entry. 8 U.S.C. 
$ 1182(d)(3) (1982). 
39. See 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(aX28) (1982). Aliens who published, or belonged to 
organizations that published, materials advocating viewpoints espoused by such 
groups were also barred. Id. 
40. 8 U.S.C. $ 1182(aX27) (1982). 
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ment? Eventually, DOS officials informed the consular offi- 
cers that the entry and the proposed activities of the aliens 
would prejudice the conduct of United States foreign affairs, 
and instructed that the visas be denied pursuant to  subsection 
27 for which no possible waiver existed.42 The visa applicants 
were informed of the denials accordingly, and lawsuits soon 
followed. 
The plaintiffs were a diverse group of individuals and orga- 
nizations, including several members of Congress, who had 
originally invited the foreign nationals-individuals with direct 
or indirect ties to communist governments-to come to the 
United States as speakers. The plaintiffs brought suit in their 
own right43 challenging the visa denials on grounds that the 
DOS had improperly denied visas through an erroneous appli- 
cation of the statute and that the American plaintiffs' first 
amendment right to  engage in dialogue with these foreign 
nationals had been violated? Among other arguments, 
plaintiffs contended that the activities they proposed to engage 
in posed no danger to the public interest or the safety, security, 
or welfare of the United States and that the statute itself did 
not permit exclusion on the grounds that entry alone was prej- 
udicial to  those interests. 
The district court granted the government's request for 
summary judg~nent.'~ The plaintiffs then appealed to the 
41. Government's Brief at 10, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
42. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 881 (D.D.C. 1984). 
43. The INA does not of itself endow plaintiffs with a right of action, but the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $$ 701-706 (1982), which complements stat- 
utes controlling agency behavior, does. Specifically, $ 702 affords a right of review 
to "[a] person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or [who is] ad- 
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute." 5 U.S.C. $ 702 (1972). Although the government had argued in the dis- 
trict court that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to  challenge the visa 
denials, the court concluded that qu]nquestionably, [plaintiffs were] 'aggrieved' by 
the State Department's resort to section 1182(a)(27) [for which no waiver of 
excludability was possible] to keep out people they have invited to engage in open 
discourse with them within the United States . . . ." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 
1043, 1050-51 (D.C. Cir. 1986), af'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Accordingly, 
they were, as the district court observed, at least arguably within the zone regulat- 
ed by the statute. Id. Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals affwmed this conclu- 
sion. Id. 
44. Although the district court had decided the first amendment issue on the 
basis of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court of Appeals consid- 
ered this case as presenting special circumstances and that the court should pro- 
ceed in a manner that avoided a constitutional confrontation. See Abourezk, 785 
F.2d at 1049. 
45. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that the 
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which 
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further pro- 
ceedings. From that ruling, the Supreme Court granted certio- 
rari. Due to an evenly divided court, the Supreme Court af- 
firmed the result reached in the Court of Appeals? 
The statutory issues raised in the Court of Appeals ad- 
dressed the meaning of former section 212(a)(27) of the INA. 
The Court of Appeals considered whether section 212(a)(27) 
permitted exclusion only when the alien sought entry into the 
United States to engage in activities that the government deter- 
mined would be prejudicial to  the national interest as the 
plaintiffs had argued, or simply because the alien's mere pres- 
ence here would be prejudicial to  the national interest, as the 
government contended? In the district court, Judge Greene 
had concluded that in the particular context of this case, the 
distinction between an alien's activities and his or her mere 
presence in the United States is one without a difference, citing 
to  the 1979 incident involving the seizure of American hostages 
in the U.S. embassy in Tehran following the entry of the Shah 
of Iran into the United States." Of significant note, the legis- 
lative history accompanying the recently enacted, newly-crafted 
"foreign policy" exclusion provision also cites to this particular 
incident. 
B. The Mandate of Chevron 
Chevron USA. ,  Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
~ n c . ~ '  controls the judicial review process in cases such as 
Abourezk involving an agency's interpretation of a statute . The 
specific visa denials were within the DOS's statutory and constitutional authority), 
rev'd 785 F.2d 1043 0.C. Cir. 1986) (on statutory grounds only and remanded con- 
cluding that material issues of fad remained to be resolved in the district court), 
af'd per curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
46. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) aff'd per curium, 484 
U.S. 1 (1987). 
47. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at  1053. 
48. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 884-85. Judge Harold H. Greene, in reaching 
his conclusion, observed that the best proof of the government's position here was 
the case of the former Shah of Iran whose mere entry into the United States pro- 
voked the 1979 American Hostages incident in Tehran. As Judge Greene further 
observed: Given these most serious consequences for the United States resulting 
from the Shah's admission, "[ilt is thus not surprising that the Executive, in con- 
struing subsection (27)' has not made the distinction plaintas ask the Court to  
draw." Id. at 884. 
49. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Court in Chevron assembled an analytical framework-albeit a 
rickety one-for assessing the validity of an administrative 
agency's construction of the statute that the agency is charged 
with admini~tering.~~ The Court established a two-step ap- 
proach t o  analyze the interpretive issue presented to  a review- 
ing court. First, "[ilf the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con- 
gre~s."~' But if a court determines that Congress has not di- 
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, it may not sub- 
stitute its own construction of the statute, as would be the case 
in the absence of an administrative interpretati~n.~~ "Rather, 
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to  the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer 
is based on a permissible construction of the statute."53 In oth- 
er words, the principle of deference to reasonable administra- 
tive interpretations applies where congressional intent is not 
clearly expressed on the precise question at issue.54 Such is 
the case here. And "clear evidence of interpretive intent . . . is 
a rarity."55 
The judges in Abourezk ostensibly followed the guidance 
offered by the criteria set forth in Chevron. Although Chevron 
favors deference," it does not eliminate statutory interpreta- 
tion; it merely disguises it.57 Terms like "unambiguous man- 
date" and "permissible interpretation" are elastic enough to 
permit a judge to build what she will out of the language. 
50. Stephen M. Lynch, Note, A Framework For Judicial Review of An 
Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De- 
fense Council, 1985 Duke L.J. 469, 470. 
51. Chevron, 467 U S .  at 842-43. 
52. Id. at  843. 
53. Id. (emphasis added). 
54. Diver, supra note 1, a t  570. 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 
(1992) (stating that Chevron announced a "fundamental principle of our law, one 
requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory interpretation by an adminis- 
tering agency"). But cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U S .  421 (1987) (demonstrat- 
ing that the deference principle does not necessarily apply in every case involving 
an agency construction of a broad or ambiguously expressed statutory provision). 
57. As one legal commentator has suggested, "Chevron's limitation of the 
federal courts' interpretive authority is properly understood as a self-imposed re- 
striction, born of prudence, rather than a constitutional or statutory imperative." 
Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Stat- 
utes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 1991 WH. L. REV. 1275, 1275. 
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Chevron itself, in other words, does not provide-except in the 
easiest of cases-the judge with workable guidance. 
Nevertheless, the first task for the judge is to interpret the 
statute to  determine whether there has been an unambiguous 
mandate. If not, the judge is to apply to the agency's construc- 
tion of the statutory provision in question some standards of 
interpretation to determine whether the agency decision was a 
permissible, to  wit, "reasonable" interpretation. Chevron coun- 
sels judges to employ the traditional tools of statutory interpre- 
tation in resolving the first prong of the mandate.58 These 
tools involve the text, the context including legislative history, 
subsequent events and policy grounds. Each of these elements 
tends to carry with it a theory that depends on that element 
alone, and each such theory is inadequate to  the extent it ig- 
nores the other considerations. This is particularly so in the 
application of the "plain meaning" rule. 
C. The Text of Subsection 27 and the "Plain Meaning" Rule 
The statutory language supports the view that exclusion 
cannot be based on the effect of entry alone, since it refers t o  
"engaging" in "activities" and no reference to mere physical 
presence appears in the text. Further, as the majority in 
Abourezk pointed out, other subsections of the statute specif- 
ically designate whether the exclusion is based on status or on 
activities. This reinforces a reading of the language which per- 
mits exclusion under subsection 27 only for "activities." Judge 
Ginsburg then stated, "[tlhe language of the statute, as the 
Dissent acknowledges, supports the plaintiffs' interpretation on 
this issue."5g Former Judge Bork in dissent admitted, "[hlad 
we before us nothing but the language of the statute, without 
any legislative history, I might be inclined to adopt the con- 
struction proposed by the plaintifkW0 
The plain meaning rule thus restricts a court to the literal 
meaning of the words of the s ta t~ te .~ '  Extrinsic evidence can 
58. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 
123 (1987) (observing that the first prong of the Chevron test, i.e., determining 
congressional intent, is purely a legal question to be guided by "traditional tools of 
statutory construction"). 
59. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
60. Id. at 1066. 
61. The plain meaning rule has been around for some time now. As the de- 
bate surrounding the various approaches to statutory interpretation heats up in the 
wake of Chevron, it has been labelled one of the elements in a new interpretive 
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be considered only if the statutory language is unclear or am- 
biguous. Application of the plain meaning rule would dictate 
the adoption of the plaintiffs' construction of the statutory 
terms. Presumably, if that were the end of the inquiry, the 
agency's construction would be patently "unreasonable" and 
thus fail. But none of the opinions rendered in the 
case--district or appellate-rested their conclusions on the 
express statutory language. In other words, none of the judges 
relied upon a literal interpretation or plain meaning of the 
statutory language. 
Once prominent in decisional law, the plain meaning rule 
has long been out of favor among academics.62 The Supreme 
Court apparently abandoned it as well years ago, but, aston- 
ishingly, resurrected it quite particularly in the 
context of immigration law.64 The usual rationale for the plain 
meaning approach is that, as Justice Scalia has said, "Ijludges 
interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' inten- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~  Several reasons exist for not "reconstructing" those 
"intentions": First, the plain meaning-that is, the interpreta- 
tion given by a reasonable person reading only the statute-is 
more accessible and the statute is more likely to be read consis- 
tently (in other words, without the clutter of the legislative 
history).66 Second, a plain meaning approach is also said t o  
approach called "textualism." Mashaw, supra note 3, at 829 (citing William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)); see also, Nicho- 
las S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The 'New* New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1597-98 (1991) (noting Prof. Eskridge's characterizing Jus- 
tice Scalia's approach as the "new textualism"). 
62. See, e.g., Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to 
Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories, 38 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 815, 818 (1990). See generally W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUT- 
SHELL 206-12 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the application of the plain meaning rule 
more as a rule concerning what evidence to consider rather than an interpretive 
approach). 
63. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 
(1989) ("[Als long as the statutory scheme is coherent and amistent, there gener- 
ally is no need for a court t o  inquire beyond the plain language of the statute."). 
Justice Scalia has been a leader in the renascence of the plain meaning rule. See, 
e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring) 
("[Ilf the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effedcat 
least in the absence of a patent absurdity."). Judge Easterbrook also endorses the 
plain meaning rule. See Easterbrook, supm note 3, at 65. 
64. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984) (adopting a literal in- 
terpretation of the term "continuous physical presence" which was even contrary to 
the government's construction of the statutory provision). 
65. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53. 
66. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 66. 
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"discipline" the legislature, to penalize it when the intent has 
not been made evident in the statutory language. Finally, a 
more sophisticated argument suggests that because most legis- 
lation results from the desire of individual legislators to be re- 
elected rather than from a desire to serve the public good, a 
limiting form of construction--such as plain meaning-is an 
effective form of damage control.B7 
The standard critique of the plain meaning rule is that it is 
simplistic in its approach to language, for it assumes that lam 
guage can be understood outside of context.68 Another objec- 
tion is that it strongly inhibits the ability of the legislature to 
pass a statute which can be adapted to changing or unantici- 
pated circumstances-hence its appeal to non-activist judg- 
e ~ . ~ ~  Finally, a plain meaning advocate is at a loss when the 
language is found not plain. There is no accompanying system- 
atic method of looking at legislative history. This is not mere 
quibbling; in the absence of a principled approach to an inter- 
pretive question, the search through extrinsic evidence becomes 
merely ad hoe. 
In Abourezk, the government argued that the language was 
susceptible to  an interpretation which would make "entry" 
sufficient grounds for exclusion. Judge Bork agreed: "[Ilt is not 
at all clear-from the language alone-whether presence within 
this country can itself be deemed an 'a~tivity.'"~~ Individuals 
in this country are always engaging in some activity, even if it 
is just sleeping. If an alien's presence is prejudicial to the na- 
tional interest or security, her activity is prejudicial because 
she must be present to engage in it. Although this is a possible 
interpretation, it is a strained one. A reasonable person would 
not ordinarily think that an alien who seeks to enter the Unit- 
ed States to go skiing at Aspen was seeking to enter the coun- 
try "to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the 
67. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 20, 27-28 (1988). This last reason highlights what may be the real 
reason for renewed judicial interest in plain meaning. It serves admirably the pur- 
pose of conservative judges who wish to restrict the range of liberal legislation. Cf. 
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in 
the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). I t  is no surprise, therefore, that 
jurists like Scalia and Easterbrook have become zealous advocates of the rule. 
Abourezk, however, demonstrates the potential of plain meaning to cut the other 
way-limiting the scope of restrictive laws as well. 
68. See, e.g., REYNOLDS, supra note 62, at  192-93. 
69. REYNOLDS, supra note 62, at 211. 
70. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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public interest or endanger the welfare, safety or security of 
the United States." Nevertheless, no word can be understood 
out of its context. Read without regard to context, the statutory 
language seems to deal only with concern for activities and not 
with presence. If, however, the language is approached with 
the expectation that it authorizes exclusion where entry would 
be prejudicial, the words will bear that meaning. Thus, the 
existence of ambiguity depends upon some concern beyond the 
words on the page. 
Justice Scalia, in Cardoza-Fonseca," made abundantly 
clear that legislative history wqs never relevant in the adminis- 
trative  ont text.'^ If there is ambiguity, the agency's view wins. 
This case illustrates the problem of determining ambiguity. All 
words have meaning dependant on context. In the absence of 
any other context, the reader may assume a context inferred 
from the language and conclude that the meaning is plain. If 
that context is shown to be inaccurate, the meaning may no 
longer be plain. Discovery of ambiguity requires some attention 
to the surrounding circumstances. Hence, even a plain meaning 
court should turn to legislative history to put the language in 
context. But the plain meaning court rejects such guidance. 
Advocates of the plain meaning rule do not get to  the legisla- 
tive history until they find that the statute on its face is ambig- 
uous. 
111. THE CONTEXT OF SUBSECTION 27: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
AND ORIGINAL INTENT-THE DECEPTION OF THE DISSENT 
The legislative history of former INA 5 212(a)(27) is rich 
and instructive for those who believe that it is relevant to 
problems of statutory interpretation.73 Anyone, in other 
words, who is interested in the questions of legislative intent or  
71. 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judges interpret laws 
rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is 
clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."). 
72. See, e.g., Schanck, supra note 62, at 847 ("Justice Scalia has excoriated 
legislative histories suggesting that they be held inadmissible.") In fact, Justice 
Scalia is considered to be the "high priest" of the new textualism, exalting statuto- 
ry text over other extrinsic sources of statutory meaning. Mashaw, supra note 3, at  
835. 
73. See, e.g., James M. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. 
L. REV. 886, 887-88 (1930) (noting that the language of the statute, legislative 
history, and statutory purpose often provides rich and compelling evidence of con- 
gressional intent). 
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purpose will find much ore to mine in this material. The ques- 
tion for those persons is what they do with what they find." 
A. Legislative History 
Section 212(a)(27) enacted in 1952, traces its lineage t o  
laws passed in 1950, 1948, and 1941. This trail leads the stu- 
dent through fascinating chapters in United States history 
when the threat of fascist and communist subversion seemed 
especially vivid to  Congress. Section 212(a)(27) along with sec- 
tion 212(a)(28)-the original ground of exclusion in this 
case-embody Congress's attempt to deal with this problem. 
Ever since their adoption, controversy has surrounded 
these exclusion grounds. Although used less frequently than 
they were immediately after their passage, they remained im- 
mune t o  reform effortsv5 and a part of the law only until fairly 
recently.76 These grounds reflect a period in American history 
characterized by anticommunist hysteria, one which led to the 
passage of "xenophobic legi~lation."'~ 
The antecedents of section 212(a)(27) date to  the early part 
of this century.78 The provision relating to  anarchists was 
adopted by Congress in 1903 in the wake of President 
McKinley's assassination, and supplemented by the Anarchist 
Act of 1918, which was applied broadly to  cover communists as 
well as other political s undesirable^."^^ Sanctions against 
74. While quoting Judge Leventhal's observation about the use of legislative 
materials, Judge Wald of the Distrid of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
that the use of legislative history is similar to "looking over a crowd and picking 
out your friends." Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the. Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1982). This is 
no less true about the decision-making process in Abourezk. 
75. See ALEINKOFF & MAR!~'IN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 183 (1st ed. 
1985) (noting that "[elven the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy, which carried out an otherwise comprehensive study of immigration laws 
from 1978 through 1981, ducked the thorny political controversies that might be 
involved in recasting the grounds of exclusion"). 
76. See H.R. REP. No. 955, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. 128-31 (1990). 
77. Carlos 0. Miranda, Rethinking the Role of Politics in United States Immi- 
gration Law: The Helsinki Accords and Ideological Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 301, 319 (1988). 
78. See generally Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Repre- 
sentatives, Grounds for Exclusion of Aliens Under The Immigration And Nation- 
ality Ad, Serial No. 7 at 5-27 (1988). 
79. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, $5 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221 and 
the Anarchist Ad of October 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012. See also E. HUTCH- 
INSON, LEGISI~ATIVE H I ~ R Y  OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 423- 
27 (1981). 
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aliens who had engaged in activities considered subversive 
were enhanced by the Smith Act of 1940.80 
In 1941, six months before Pearl Harbor, Congress passed 
another act which barred issuance of visas to aliens who sought 
entry to  engage in activities deemed an endangerment to the 
public safety of this ~ountry.~' The 1941 Act was not part of 
the Immigration Act. However, the concept of excluding aliens 
who were expected to endanger the public safety found its way 
into the Act of May 25, 1948.~~ The 1948 enactment was 
passed at  the beginning of the post-war "Red Scare." Finally, in 
1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Acti-originally 
sponsored by the House Un-American Activities Commit- 
tee-which contained, in almost identical language, the 
exclusionary bars carried over into sections 212(aX27) and (28) 
which Congress adopted in 1952 during the Cold War years as 
part of the thirty-three grounds for exclusion of the McCarran- 
Walter 
A closer look at the individual enactments highlights the 
sloppy use of the provision's legislative history by both the 
majority and dissent in Abourezk. Much of the difEculty arises 
from legislators' use of sweeping language in a casual manner 
t o  describe technical language. If an alien intends to engage in 
activities dangerous to the national safety, her presence in this 
country is dangerous to the national safety. A law which ex- 
cludes her because of the likelihood that she will engage in 
such activities, therefore, may be described as a law that keeps 
out persons whose presence is dangerous to  the national safety, 
even though it does not exclude all persons who present such a 
danger. 
For example, the law passed in 1941 uses the term "activi- 
ties" to  describe the exclusionary bar to admission-a clear 
antecedent to  the present ground.s4 The Senate Report stated 
80. Alien Registration Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 670 is commonly re- 
ferred to as the Smith Act. 
81. A d  of June 20, 1941, ch. 209, 55 Stat. 252, supplemented the 1918 Act. 
82. Act of May 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-552, 62 Stat. 268, repealed by Immi- 
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, $ 403(a)(48), 66 Stat. 279, 280. 
83. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Title I, 8 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006. 
84. In pertinent part, it reads: 
That whenever any American diplomatic or consular officer knows or 
has reason to believe that any alien seeks to enter the United States for 
the purpose of engaging in activities which will endanger the public safe- 
ty of the United States, he shall refuse to issue to such alien any immi- 
gration visa, passport visa, transit certificate, or other document entitling 
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in  its purpose paragraph, however, that the bill was to keep 
out "certain aliens, otherwise admissible, whose presence in  the 
United States would be dangerous to the public safety."85 Fur- 
ther, a letter from the Attorney General and one from the Act- 
ing Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Immigration also referred briefly to the fact that the bill 
would prohibit the "entry" or the "admission" of certain aliens 
into the United States? 
Judge Bork's dissent in Abourezk quoted these references 
and noted that the Committee Chairman, on the Senate floor, 
also referred to the bill as denying visas to those whose "pres- 
ence" would be "inimical to the public interest."' Bork con- 
cluded from this that Congress understood the term "activities" 
to encompass entry and presen~e.'~ Judge Ginsburg, who cited 
no legislative history on this point, merely stated that the ma- 
jority did not find the legislative history of the 1941 Act to be 
as clear as the dissent found it?' 
To add to the confusion over the meaning of these terms, 
the letter to the Senate Committee Chairman on Immigration 
from the Attorney General also described the bill in another 
way, namely, that a visa shall be denied when an "alien wishes 
to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activi- 
ties which would endanger the public safety."g0 This passage, 
admittedly, quotes the key language of the bill. However, it 
redirects our attention to "activities" as the condition precedent 
for an  alien to be denied admission into the United States. 
Whether Bork's references to the bill's content should be 
taken, as Ginsburg stated, "as drafted more meticulously and 
as reflecting congressional will more accurately than the statu- 
tory text itself,"'' is a central issue throughout Bork's analy- 
sis. The scope of the bill is so short and so easily grasped by a 
quick reading that accurate statements about its content would 
have to repeat word for word the language of the bill. This sug- 
such alien to present himself for admission into the United States. 
A d  of June 20, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252, repealed by Immigration 
and Nationality A d  of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(43). 
85. S. REP. NO. 386, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1941) (emphasis added). 
86. Id. at 1-2. 
87. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
88. Id. at 1066. 
89. Id. at 1054-55 a l l .  
90. S. REP. NO. 386, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1941). 
91. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1054 a l l .  
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gests that the references Bork cited may have been casual 
comments. Thus, Bork's analysis of the legislative history is, at  
best, overstatedeg2 
More persuasive that the Senate committee chairman's 
comments were casual references is the evidence of his errors 
in describing the bill. Although the bill concerned activities 
that endanger the "public safety," the chairman said it con- 
cerned the endangerment of "public interest." It seems unlikely 
that those two terms are synonymous because one is a good 
deal more narrow in scope than the other. If the chairman 
erred about the very nature of the bill, additional errors are all 
too possible. Bork's analysis, therefore, loses some ground here. 
The 1948 amendment tracked the language of the 1941 
Act, and also involved the Attorney General in decisions to 
admit or exclude aliens. The amendment provided that "aliens 
who the Attorney General knows or has reason to  believe seek 
to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activi- 
ties which will endanger the public safety of the United States" 
shall be excluded.g3 The significance of the amendment to the 
Abourezk case is not easily overstated because this provision 
eventually emerged as 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a)(27). Obviously, the 
legislative history of the 1948 Amendment should have been 
considered in Abourezk, yet both judges ignored it in their 
opinions. 
The Senate and House reports, which duplicate one anoth- 
er, provide interesting insight. Each states that Congress 
amended "the immigration laws to  deny admission to  the Unit- 
ed States of persons who may be coming here for the purpose of 
engaging in activities which will endanger the public safe- 
ty . . . ."94 Each then refers to  a letter from the Assistant At- 
torney General that "so completely described [the bill] . . . that 
further discussion is u~eces sa ry . "~~  The letter also refers to  
the term "acti~ities. '~~ 
92. Also, as discussed more fully below, selective reliance on legislative histo- 
ry materials could masquerade for judicial candor or a lack thereof. 
93. Act of May 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-552, 62 Stat. 268, repealed by Immi- 
gration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(48), 66 Stat. 279, 280. 
94. H.R. REP. NO. 1286, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948). 
95. Id. at 1-2. 
96. In pertinent part the letter reads: 
Under existing law (22 U.S.C. 9 228), whenever an American diplomat or 
consular officer knows or has reason to believe that an alien seeks to 
enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in activities that will 
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All of these sources support the view that Congress intend- 
ed the amendment to  exclude aliens on the basis of contemplat- 
ed activity in the United States, but not for prejudicial entry as 
Judge Bork would have it. The Attorney General's letter is 
most instructive on this point for it states that the bill is de- 
signed to  correct the problem of concealment of purpose which 
could lead to a lawful admission. The intent to  engage in activi- 
ties can be concealed, but when an alien requests a visa, there 
is no concealment, nor can there be, of an intent to enter the 
United States. 
The purpose of the Internal Security Act of 
1950-according to  the Senate report-was to strengthen exist- 
ing law regarding the exclusion and deportation of subversive 
aliens.97 The House Un-American Activities Committee, which 
originally sponsored the bill, however, was primarily concerned 
with the "enemy within," i.e., communist activities in the Unit- 
ed States." It was the Senate, however, that undertook a re- 
vision of the Immigration Act and redrafted the language that 
became section 212(a)(27).~' The final draft of the Internal 
Security Act blended the concerns of both Houses of Congress. 
Although the House report concerning the original bill, 
which was later amended, suggests that the House was focused 
on the acts of subversives and not the mere entry of certain 
 individual^,'^^ the apparent focus on activities per se must be 
endanger the public safety, he must refuse to issue to such alien an im- 
migration visa or any other document entitling the alien to present him- 
self for admission into the country. However, if the alien succeeds in 
concealing such purpose from the diplomatic or consular officer and ob- 
tains a visa or other travel document, he cannot legally be denied admis- 
sion on the ground of his [sic] purpose after he reaches the United 
States. 
The bill under consideration would correct this . . . . 
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
97. S. REP. NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950). 
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886. 
99. H.R. COW. REP. NO. 3112, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886, 3899-900, 1001. 
100. The House Report states: 
[W]e contend that, under our constitutional system, ideas must be combat- 
ed with ideas and not with legislation. If communism in the United 
States operated in the open, without foreign direction, and without at- 
tempting to set up a dictatorship subservient to a foreign power, legisla- 
tion directed against it would neither be justified nor necessary. 
* * *  
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considered in another light. The original House bill was not 
directed at aliens but at United States citizens who may have 
been attempting to  subvert the government. Thus, the House 
report does not shed much light on congressional thinking 
regarding the admission of aliens, except to suggest that activi- 
ties, not mere presence, was on the collective mind of the 
House. 
The Senate, which sponsored the revision of the Immigra- 
tion Act, reworked and added language to the 1948 amendment 
to  exclude from admission "[alliens who seek to enter the Unit- 
ed States whether solely, principally, or incidentally, to  engage 
in activities which would be prejudicial to  the public interest, 
or would endanger the welfare or safety of the United 
States."lol Three changes in the 1948 amendment resulted 
from this new language: (1) elimination of the reference to  the 
Attorney General (this was inserted in another subsection); (2) 
clarification that any intent to engage in certain acts, no mat- 
ter how slight, is sufficient grounds t o  exclude; and (3) broaden- 
ing of the list of forbidden conduct to include those activities 
which are prejudicial to  the public interest or which endanger 
public safety. 
Commenting on the changes, the Senate report, which 
noted that the subsection was a mix of new and existing law, 
reintroduced ambiguity when it stated that "under existing 
law, among the excludable aliens are certain aliens who seek to 
enter the United States whose entry would be prejudicial to  the 
public interest or would endanger the safety of the United 
States."lo2 The Report also stated that the class of excludable 
aliens was broadened "to include those aliens who seek to enter 
the United States to  engage in activities which would endanger 
the welfare of the United States."lo3 
Both Ginsburg and Bork quote this passage as illustrating 
that Congress viewed the law as prohibiting prejudicial en- 
There is irrefutable evidence to support the premise that the Communist 
organization is now and has been, since its inception, engaged in the 
training of espionage specialists who are taught to infiltrate and destroy 
our Government from within. 
H.R. REP. NO. 2980, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3886, 
3888, 3891. 
101. S. REP. NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950). 
102. Id. at 5. 
103. Id. 
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try.la" The problem with this passage, however, is that its au- 
thor misstated the law. Existing law, as shown above, did not 
exclude when entry would be prejudicial but only when entry 
endangered public safety. Having made this error, the author 
goes on to  misinform the reader that the new provision merely 
adds an exclusion for activities prejudicial to  the public inter- 
est. 
Given that the passage is misleading and incorrect on 
these two points, its credibility as evidence of congressional 
intent must be reconsidered; if the author is wrong in describ- 
ing these provisions, why should he be assumed correct on 
another point of law mentioned in the same passage?'" 
Moreover, the author's reference to "existing lad' was a direct 
reference to  the 1948 amendment and, as seen earlier, the 
legislative record strongly suggests that Congress in 1948 in- 
tended exclusion to  be based only on activities, and not on 
prejudicial entry. 
Other passages in the record, not mentioned in Abourezk, 
support this interpretation. In discussing the history of the 
immigration statutes, the Senate report in several different 
places paraphrases the 1948 amendment and the 1941 law as 
excluding aliens who seek admission "for the purpose of engag- 
ing in activities."'" The terms "presence" or "entry," used in 
the manner Bork suggests are never mentioned. The period in 
which these measures were enacted also lend credence to  the 
notion that the prime concern was with an alien's activities 
while in this country. 
The Walter-McCarran Act incorporated the above provi- 
sions of the Internal Security Act into what became the now 
former section 212(a)(27) of the INA. There were only two 
changes to that subsection: (1) reinsertion of the express refer- 
ence to  the powers of the Attorney General, along with consul- 
ar officers, to exclude aliens when they have knowledge of 
certain facts; and (2) addition of activities that endanger "secu- 
rity" to the list of activities for which exclusion is possible. The 
subsection required exclusion of aliens "the consular officer or 
104. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 n.9, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
105. Of course, there is always the hypothesis that the author deliberately 
misstated the content of existing law. Two objections can be made to that point: 
first, what end would be served by a deliberate misstatement? Second, statutory 
construction would indeed be an endless quagmire if the good faith of relevant 
statements were open to question. 
106. S. REP. NO. 2230, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, 23-24 (1950). 
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the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to 
engage in activities that would be prejudicial to  the public 
interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the 
United States."'" Unfortunately, references t o  this subsection 
in the legislative record are almost nonexistent. 
The most substantive comment is found in a discussion 
about the law as it relates to  the examination of aliens before 
an immigration officer. The Senate Report notes, in passing, 
that such an examination may give rise to  exclusion under 
section 212(a)(27) for "an alien whose entry would endanger the 
public safety or se~urity."'~~ Bork notes this passage as an- 
other example that prejudicial entry was encompassed by sub- 
section 27.1°9 Since the author's focus is on another section of 
the bill, this is not persuasive evidence of such intent. 
The majority's search of the legislative history is anything 
but exhaustive. While a few passages quoted in the opinion do 
support a view that the legislative history is ambiguous with 
regard to the interpretation of subsection 27, many other pas- 
sages could have been cited by the majority which would tip 
the balance in favor of the plaintiffs9 interpretation that preju- 
dicial entry was not a sufficient ground to exclude aliens. 
Judge Bork's research is far more thorough; nonetheless, 
one must conclude that he was either not very careful in his 
research or very selective in what he used. If the latter is an 
accurate characterization then Bork has engaged in the tactics 
of an advocate and not the role of a judge resolving the issue in 
accordance with established rules. 
Judge Bork's determination is, essentially, premised on a 
series of brief, casual references-almost asides-that occasion- 
ally break through the surface of the legislative record. Sub- 
stantive comments such as that found in the record of the 1948 
amendment are entirely ignored; yet that record is certainly 
relevant to most theories of the proper interpretation of the 
statute. Moreover, the references selected by Judge Bork con- 
tain misstatements or errors which lessen their reliability as 
evidence of legislative intent. 
107. 8 U.S.C. 8 1182(a)(27) (1988). 
108. S. REP. NO. 1137, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952). 
109. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1065. 
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B. Original Intent 
The orthodox approach to  statutory interpretation treats 
statutes as static texts.'1° Legislative intent is the criterion 
that is most often cited when interpreting the meaning of stat- 
utes. According to Professor Eskridge, this "intentionalist" 
approach asks how the legislature originally intended the inter- 
pretive question to be answered, or would have intended the 
question to be answered had it thought about the issue when it 
passed the statute."' 
This "originalist" approach assumes that the legislature 
fnes the meaning of a statute to all possible applications the 
day it was enacted.ll2 The implicit claim is that a legislator 
interpreting the statute at the time of enactment would render 
the same interpretation as a judge interpreting the same stat- 
ute f a y  years later. This implication seems counterintuitive. 
Indeed, the legal realists argued this point earlier in the centu- 
ry.'13 All statutes contain gaps and ambiguities. They exist 
because the legislature has failed to anticipate them or has 
used broad and sweeping language, hence, no clear intent is 
discernable. 
The method of statutory interpretation courts most often 
invoke is to  discover legislative or "original" intent.'14 Of 
course the intention of the legislatures multi-member body of 
politicians-is not easily discoverable, especially when a com- 
plicated statute is in~olved.''~ Thus, it is difficult to conclude, 
as did Judge Bork, that the legislative history clearly supported 
the government's interpretive view. The record shows a con- 
scious concern to  exclude aliens who might do something with- 
in the United States that was harmful, but seemingly no con- 
sideration was given to the application of this provision to  
persons whose entry alone might be harmful. Judge Ginsburg 
for the majority gave Judge Bork's version of legislative history 
entirely too much credit when she cited the Senate Reports as 
being in favor of allowing exclusion for prejudicial entry, but 
she was correct when she noted, "[olne searches all the legisla- 
110. For general explanation of the intentionalist approach, see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
111. Id. at 1480 n.3. 
112. Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 22. 
113. REYNOLDS, supra note 62, at 184-85. 
114. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 869 (1930). 
115. Id. at 870. 
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tive history in vain for an illustration homing in on the ques- 
tion at issue."116 In short, there is a clear original intent con- 
cerning exclusion for activities and none concerning exclusion 
for presence. Faced with such a gap, the original intent theorist 
has no basis for determining what the drafters would have 
done. Since the language points away from application based 
on entry and the legislature did not consider its application to 
entrance which causes harm, the original intent theorist should 
not find the statute applicable. 
C. The Legal Process School 
To a legal process follower, as already noted above, the 
legislative history is rich in material."' A "modified 
intentionalist" or legal process approach uses original purpose 
rather than original intent, as the focus for interpretation.l18 
Legal process followers seek the interpretation that best fur- 
thers the purpose the original legislature had in mind when it 
enacted the statute.'lg The legal process theorist thus search- 
es for the context more intensely than the original intent theo- 
rist. The purpose is derived by analysis of the problem which 
the statute was designed to address and the interests which 
bound its solution. The difficulty with this theory lies in identi- 
fying the "purpose" of the statute. According to  Professor Cass 
Sunstein, that purpose is not discovered but created.lzO Rec- 
ognition of the difficulty in ascertaining the original intent or  
purpose has animated the debate on statutory interpretation 
and prompted scholarly challenges to  the usual approach which 
focuses a resolution of interpretive issues on traditional theo- 
ries of statutory interpretation.12' 
116. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
117. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MARING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1150-57 (tentative ed. 1958). The Hart and 
Sacks approach, also referred to as the legal process" approach, follows the tra- 
ditional search for legislative history through the text, legislative history and pur- 
pose. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 353-54. 
118. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: 
The Case for A Modikd Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (de- 
fending the originalkt model of statutory interpretation and offering a modified 
intentionalist approach). 
119. See Eskridge, supra note 110, at 1480. 
120. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAW. 
L. REV. 405, 427 (1989) (noting that "[tlhe characterization of legislative purpose is 
an act of creation rather than discovery"). 
121. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 356-57. 
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As for the interpretive issue presented in Abourezk, subsec- 
tion 27 was obviously designed to cope with the specific prob- 
lem of aliens who were likely to engage in activities in the 
United States that would be prejudicial to the public interest or 
dangerous to  public welfare and safety. While that purpose 
might be generalized to the level of protecting the national 
interests of the United States, such a generalized purpose per- 
mits almost anything since it lies behind most immigration 
statutes. A more specific purpose might be found in protection 
of the nation from dangerous activities within its borders, a 
limited purpose that would deny the agency's interpretation in 
this case. And ascertaining the 1952 legislature's original in- 
tent would be htile because it seems more likely than not that 
the precise statutory interpretation issue raised here was not 
considered at the time of the INKS enactment.lP Thus, imag- 
ination and creativity may be necessary in the judicial process 
of determining the specific statutory interpretation issue. 
D. Originalism: Of Economists and Sailors 
One of the early scholarly participants in this interpretive 
discourse, Judge Richard A. Posner,lB has urged greater 
study of statutory inter~retati0n.l~~ Judge Posner's approach 
to statutory construction, which is closely aligned t o  the legal 
process school, is best described as one of "imaginative recon- 
stru~tion."'~~ According to Judge Posner, the judge should try 
to think her way, as best she can, into the minds of the enact- 
ing legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the 
statute applied to  the case at bar? It is easy to  scoff at this 
122. As observed by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, "[olriginal intent controls, if 
only we can find it." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 60 (footnote omitted). 
123. Judge Posner is a jurist who is famous for his economic analysis of the 
law. Robert S. Summers, Jurisprudence and Political Theory: Judge Richard 
Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1302, 1302 (1991); see RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). 
124. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 336- 
40 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U .  CHI. L. REV. 800, 800-05 (1983); Richard A. Posner, Economics, 
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and t h  Constitution, 49 U .  CHI. L. REV. 263 
(1982) (discussing the impad of an economic theory of legislation on how judges 
"interpret legislative provisions, both statutory and constitutional"). 
125. Although his suggested approach closely resembles that of legal process 
adherents, Judge Posner distinguishes his method by challenging the legal process 
view that statutory purpose can guide the court's interpretive determination. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 819-20. 
126. "The true law, the governing rule, is not down on paper; it is in the 
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approach. Judges dter all, lack the requisite imagination for 
the most part and what they will do in practice is assume that 
the legislators were people just like themselves; the interpre- 
tive process then will consist of judges voting for their own per- 
sonal preferences and ascribing them to the statute's drafters. 
But Judge Posner insists that if one assumes a judge who will 
try, with the aid of a reasonable intelligence, to put herself in 
the place of the enacting legislators, then she will do better if 
she follows the suggested approach than if she tries to  apply 
the canons of statutory interpretation. 
If Judge Posner's approach had been followed in Abourezk, 
the conclusion would have been that at the time of enactment, 
the legislators would have wanted the agency's interpretation 
to  be applied. After all, the Congress that enacted these exclu- 
sion provisions in 1952 had every intention to keep out aliens 
for decidedly political reasons, an intention that President 
Truman considered objectionable enough for him to veto the 
bill when it was first submitted to  him for signature.12' The 
override of that veto by two-thirds majorities in both houses of 
Congress certainly evidenced congressional intent with respect 
t o  these provisions, and the weakly-worded McGovern Amend- 
ment, discussed more f d y  below, does little to mitigate the ef- 
fect of the original congressional action? 
An imaginative reconstruction of the statute essentially re- 
quires a court to say that a frightened and timid legislature 
would have wanted to pervert the language of their own stat- 
ute to reach any situation that might be thought undesir- 
able-a sort of delegation by fear that seems the antithesis of 
statutory interpretation. One might equally well imagine the 
initial legislator saying that the problem of "prejudicial entry" 
must be dealt with through another statute since it was a con- 
minds of the legislators." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at  60-61. 
127. 98 CONG. REC. 8082, 8084 (1952) (veto message of Pres. Truman, June 
25, 1952). 
128. As reported by the Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1985: 
As President Truman warned, "[s]eldom has a bill exhibited the dis- 
trust evidenced here for citizens and aliens alike." [footnote omitted.] On 
their face, then, the ideological exclusion provisions conflict with the tradi- 
tional values of the United States. In practice, the law is an unabashedly 
cynical betrayal of those proclaimed beliefs. 
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 253 (1985) [hereinafter Visa Denials]. 
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cern she had never previously considered. Indeed, a less timid 
legislature in 1990 did exactly that, to wit, enacted an entirely 
new provision to address the problem.lzg 
Judge Posner's "imaginative reconstruction" approach is in 
sharp contrast to  the one advanced by Professor Alexander 
Aleinikoff which also utilizes originalist sources.130 While 
Judge Posner looks to the past much like an archeologist, Pro- 
fessor Aleinikoff offers a prescription for the present-minded. 
The approach sketched out by Professor Aleinikoff is known as 
the "nautical" approach t o  statutory interpretation: "A statute 
is an ongoing process in which both the shipbuilder and the 
subsequent navigator play a role. The dimensions and struc- 
ture of the craft determine where it is capable of going, but the 
current course is set by the crew on board."131 Such an ap- 
proach thus takes into account current values. This approach 
urges judges to apply the traditional tools of originalist theo- 
rists in a "present-minded way."'" 
The nature of judicial process would seem to  support a 
more "present-minded" approach to  solving interpretive prob- 
lems. Perhaps unconsciously, judges already engage in updat- 
ing statutes while professing t o  follow traditional approaches. 
As Professor Nicholas Zeppos has observed: "Try as they might, 
judges cannot completely place themselves outside the context 
in which [the process of] statutory interpretation  occur^."'^ 
Even Judge Posner in recent years has become more skeptical 
about a judge's ability to place herself in a mindset associated 
with the past? But it is unlikely that he would adopt an ap- 
proach to  statutory interpretation that expands the process 
past the outer perimeter of traditional judicial conduct and 
129. See infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text. 
130. See Zeppos, supm note 14, at 356 n.18 (noting that Judge Posner's sug- 
gested approach has been "challenged as both unworkable and unresponsive to 
democratic values"). 
131. Aleinikoff, supra note 67, at 20. The nautical approach is in keeping with 
the more modern, evolutive approaches advanced by others, but examines it from a 
different perspective. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 358. According to Professor Zeppos, 
the nautical approach-although it challenges the legitimacy of the originalist ap- 
proach to statutory interpretation-may, nonetheless, "be consistent with the 
originalist framework that continues to dominate judicial opinions." Id. at 358 n.26. 
132. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 411. 
133. Id. at 411. 
134. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skpticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
827, 849-5 1 (1988) (conceding that imaginative reconstruction of legislative intent of 
a past legislature may fail because of the present-minded context in which the 
interpreter undertakes the interpretive task). 
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engages, in effect, in judicial legislation. Such, arguably, is the 
potential end result of an evolutionary or more dynamic ap- 
proach to deciding interpretive questions in the administrative 
context. 
IV. EVOLUTIVE THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS-THE IRRELEVANCE 
OF THE MAJORITY 
If the legislative history is so insufficient as to  preclude a 
determination of ambiguity, another avenue of pursuit of the 
meaning of a statute would be to interpret it dynamically, as 
several legal commentators have ~uggested.''~ For some 
scholars, doubts about the proper construction of a statute are 
resolved not just by looking at language, history, and context; 
later developments should also play a role. Thus, in contrast t o  
an archeological approach, dynamic theorists ask how a partic- 
ular statute can be read t o  meet the needs of present-day so- 
ciety. ''' 
This approach is appealing because it is realistic in the 
present-minded sense. "Gaps and ambiguities exist in all stat- 
utes, typically concerning matters as to which there was little 
legislative deliberation."'" Such is the situation in Abourezk. 
For dynamic theorists, "the quest is not properly for the sense 
originally intended by the statute, [or] for the sense sought 
originally to  be put into it, but rather for the sense which can 
be quarried out of it in the light of the new ~ituation."'~ 
Thus, the interpretive approach under these circumstances 
should be one in which an interpreter asks not "what the legis- 
lation means abstractly, or even on the basis of legislative 
history, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs 
and goals of our present-day ~ociety.""~ 
135. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supm note 67, at 20; William N. Eskridge Jr., Dy- 
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U .  PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). For the most pro- 
vocative and much criticized challenge to originalism as a method of statutory 
interpretation, see G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(1982). 
136. But note that such theories also raise the problem of legislative suprem- 
acy. See, e.g., Maltz, supm note 118, at 12 (noting that the approaches of those 
advocating a dynamic interpretation are inconsistent with the theory of legislative 
supremacy). 
137. Eskridge, supm 110, at 1480. 
138. See id. at 1480 n.5 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of 
Appellate Decision and the Rllles or Canons about How Statutes are to be Con- 
strued, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950) (emphasis deleted)). 
139. Id. at n.6 (quoting Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Stat- 
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When such a determination is made in light of the "soci- 
etal, political, and legal context," the agency's interpretation 
appears to be inconsistent with the present-day political cli- 
mate which has witnessed the ushering in of a new world (po- 
litical) order. In Abourezk, however, the agency determination 
seemed consistent with certain subsequent events on the one 
hand;140 but contrary to the societal and political context of 
subsequent amendments to the statute on the other hand.l4' 
Specifically, the ever-expanding grounds of exclusion were 
narrowed, somewhat, in 1977 in response to an international 
agreement designed to foster greater freedom between signato- 
ry states and to promote greater flow of information across 
borders. 
A. Helsinki Accords and McGbvern Amendment 
Seeking to secure human rights throughout the world, the 
United States signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975. While the 
United States saw the Accords as a method to pressure the 
then Soviet Union's policy with respect to emigration, the Ac- 
cords also reflected on the United States' own immigration 
policy. The signatories pledged themselves to facilitate and 
foster greater international freedom of movement and exchange 
of ideas. 
The principle underlying both the first amendment and the 
Helsinki Accords is the concept of an open "marketplace of 
ideas." Under the first amendment, United States citizens are 
guaranteed the right to receive and exchange ideas with 
whomever they wish. The Basket I11 provisions of the Accords 
extend this principle to the international arena by facilitating 
the free exchange of ideas and persons across national bor- 
ders. The Accords, as an international declaration, seek to 
accomplish universal freedom of expression, a goal which is of 
particular significance to the international community of 
writers. 142 
utes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456, 469 (1950)). 
140. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text on the discussion about the 
Shah of Iran and the Tehran Hostage incident and the newlycraRed "foreign poli- 
cy" exclusion ground passed in the 1990 amendment to the INA; see also H.R. 
COW. REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1990) (citing the Shah of Iran's 
mere presence in the United States as the trigger for the Iran hostage crisis). 
141. See infra notes 142-150 and accompanying text on the Helsinski Accords 
and the McGovern Amendment. 
142. Miranda, supm note 77, at 307. 
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The ideological exclusion provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, former subsections 27, 28, and 29, inhibited 
the free flow of ideas and persons across national boundaries. 
One of the issues in Abourezk was whether subsection 27 
should have been interpreted narrowly to  avoid exclusions in 
light of the Helsinki Accords. The denial of entry in the 
Abourezk case directly conflicted with the tenor of the Helsinki 
Accords. 143 
The Helsinki Accords were not the only indication of a 
liberalizing environment for international movement. In 1977, 
former subsection 28-the most controversial of the three ideo- 
logical and  nat ional  i n t e r e s t s  exclusion provi- 
~ions'~~-underwent legislative modification of questionable 
significance, when Congress enacted the McGovern Amend- 
ment.'" This amendment sought to  assure United States 
compliance with the Helsinki Final Act with regard to  free 
movement across international borders, and t o  encourage other 
signatories to comply with the terms of the Final Act.'" Sub- 
section 28 was the only one of the three formerly ideological 
and national interests grounds for exclusion for which a waiver 
of admissibility was available. Under the amendment, within 
thirty days of a visa denial because of with a pro- 
scribed organization, the Secretary of State "~hould"'~' recom- 
mend to the Attorney General that a waiver be granted if the 
alien was "otherwise admissible to  the United States."148 This 
latter point is emphasized in a second sentence in the statutory 
provision: "Nothing in this section may be construed as autho- 
rizing or requiring the admission to the United States of any 
alien who is excludible for reasons other than membership in o r  
filiation with a proscribed organi~ation."'~~ Neither sub- 
143. Id. at 305. 
144. The third ground of exclusion was INA 6 212(a)(29). 
145. Pub. L. No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 848 (1977) (codified as amended a t  
22 U.S.C. $ 2691 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-649, Ti- 
tle VI, $ 603(aX18>, 104 Stat. 5084 (1990). 
146. Miranda, supm note 77, at  310. But see id. at 310 33.55 (reserving the 
right to restrict travel on a reciprocal basis). 
147. "Should" carries the connotation that the action ought to be executed as 
distinguished from the mandatory "shall." In other words, "should" falls in between 
"may" which connotes a discretionary determination and "shall." 
148. 22 U.S.C. 8 2691(a) (1988); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1056-58 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
149. 22 U.S.C. $ 2691(a) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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section 27 nor subsection 29 were affected by the McGovern 
Amendment. 
Since the Accords were an executive agreement rather 
than a formal treaty, they did not displace these statutory 
provisions. Specifically, the McGovern Amendment did not 
apply to subsection 27, the subject of the interpretive issue in 
Abourezk. The McGovern Amendment applied only to visa 
applicants who were "otherwise admissible to the United 
States."lso On any theory of original intent, the Helsinki Ac- 
cords and the McGovern Amendment were not relevant as a 
practical matter. lsl 
Nevertheless, these subsequent developments in the law 
changed the environment in which subsection 27, originally 
enacted in the Cold War days of 1952, was applied. The subse- 
quent concern for opening borders to views of persons with 
other affiliations and ideologies made anachronistic an inter- 
pretation of subsection 27 that derived from cold war fears and 
excluded persons for their associations rather than their specif- 
ic activities. However, the government argued in Abourezk that 
the reason for exclusion was based on the visa applicants' spe- 
cific governmental associations, not on blanket organizational 
communist ideology.152 If that is a correct reading of the 
government's position, then its adoption would not have nec- 
essarily been counter to the concern that ideas be free-flowing 
across international borders. But the unique characteristic of 
these denials, limited to governmental associations and not 
strictly based on ideology, made it difficult to find other in- 
stances in the record to support a consistent approach. 
150. 785 F.2d at 1069 (Bork, J., dissenting). As discussed more fully below, the 
visa applicants in Abourezk were specifically denied entry because of their govern- 
mental c o ~ e d i o n s  and not their membership in a proscribed organization. 
151. Moreover, as Professor Aleinikoff notes, the required deference to the 
agency's statutory interpretation is a shortcoming of the dynamic interpretive ap- 
proach. Aleinikoff, supm note 67, at 45-46. 
152. In the consolidated actions, the first applicant was Tomas Borge, the 
Interior Minister of Nicaragua. In his situation, the Nicaraguan government had 
applied to the U.S. embassy in Managua for his nonimmigrant visa. As for the 
circumstances surrounding the denial of a nonimmigrant visa to Nino Pasti, the 
U.S. government had argued that he was a member of an instrumentality of the 
Soviet government. In the case of Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, their 
visa applications had been conveyed by diplomatic note from the Cuban govern- 
ment. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1048-49. 
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B. Congressional Acquiescence and Past 
Administrative Practice 
On appeal in Abourezk Judge Ginsburg found the agency's 
interpretation wanting because the government had failed to 
establish a pattern of administrative practice to  support a fmd- 
ing that Congress had acquiesced in the administrative inter- 
pretation. Ginsburg concluded, therefore, that the district court 
had erred in failing t o  develop an adequate record prior to 
reaching its determination. The remand was ordered to  permit 
further discovery on this issue.ls5 As earlier noted, such an 
exercise would prove futile. 
Judge Ginsburg concluded that Congress was apprised at 
least once that the DOS actually had applied its asserted inter- 
pretation of subsection 27. According to Ginsburg, evidence of 
congressional acquiescence (or lack thereof) in an administra- 
tive construction of the statutory language during the thirty- 
four years since the Act had been passed could be impor- 
tant,'" concluding that information about such acquiescence, 
or absence of it, would rank as a significant indicator of the 
legislature's will.lSS That view is highly questionable at 
best? Nonetheless, the majority determined that the evi- 
dence of record was meager and did not demonstrate the kind 
of consistent administrative interpretation necessary t o  give 
rise to  a presumption of congressional acquie~cence.'~~ 
153. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at  1064. 
154. Id. at  1055. 
155. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1965) (showing the Court's willing- 
ness to recognize congressional acquiescence to executive discretion, giving credence 
to the Court's interpretation of subsection 27). The majority in Abourezk found that 
the two cases cited by the parties interpreting subsection 27 provided no support 
for the DOS's interpretation as evidence of congressional acquiescence in a long- 
standing judicial construction. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1055 11.12 (citing El-Werfalli 
v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 
1220 @. Mass. 1985)). In El-Werfalli, the court held that a Libyan student seeking 
to  enter the United States in order to study airplane maintenance was properly 
excluded under subsection 27. The majority in Abourezk concluded that although 
"such study does not rise to the level of subversive activity, it clearly constitutes 
an 'activity' exceeding mere presence." Id. In Allende, the majority found that the 
wurt there did not reach this precise issue because it held the government's rea- 
sons for exclusion inadequate on other grounds. Id. 
156. See generally REYNOLDS, supra note 62, at  250-54. 
157. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958) (refusing to impute to con- 
gress approval of the DOS's decisions where the decisions were "scattered 
rulings . . . not consistently of one pattern"). 
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In remanding, Judge Ginsburg failed to follow faithfully 
the guidelines of Chevron; rather, she apparently engaged in a 
form of judicial subterfuge with the hope that on remand "jus- 
tice" would be done. But to the extent that the issue could be 
considered close, Chevron commands that the court defer to  a 
reasonable administrative interpretation. In criticizing the 
remand-finding it u ~ e c e s s a r y ~ ~ ~ ~ u d g e  Bork concluded 
that the majority's decision deprived the Executive "of much of 
the flexibility and nuance that are essential in the conduct of 
foreign relations,"'" and began "a process of judicial incur- 
sion into the United States' conduct of its foreign affairs."1B0 
In remanding the case to  the district court for a fuller 
"airing of the activitylmere entry" question, the majority con- 
cluded that the legislative history was inconclusive. Thus fur- 
ther evidence of legislative acquiescence was needed before it 
could assess the validity of the agency's interpretation. In 
reaching this conclusion the majority assumed that more evi- 
dence was indeed available. Visa denials, which may have a 
substantial impact on aliens seeking admission to the United 
States, receive only limited internal administrative oversight 
and almost no judicial consideration.16' What the evidence 
did show was that there were very few visa denials in this 
area.162 It was not likely, therefore, that anything of real con- 
sequence would be accomplished on remand. Thus, the remand 
appeared to be futile on its face. Even the majority alluded to  
this when it stated that "the examples cited by the State De- 
partment, in conjunction with the inconclusive legislative histo- 
ry, however, do cast some doubt on the plaintiffs' interpreta- 
t i ~ n . " ' ~  Moreover, the Court of Appeals gave no guidance t o  
the district court concerning what to do if no further evidence 
was pertinent. 
Judge Ginsburg proclaimed that the purpose of the remand 
was to assure congressional acquiescence in the agency's inter- 
158. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1064. 
159. Id. at 1074. 
160. Id. at 1076. 
161. See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1991); see also Note, National Security Visa Denials: Delimiting 
the Exercise of Executive Exclusion Authority Under the Imnigratwn and Natwnali- 
ty Act, 28 VA. J. IN'T'L L. 711 (1988). 
162. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1067 n.2. Further, "government records relating to 
visa requests are required by law to be kept confidential." Id. at 1067-68 (citing 8 
U.S.C. 1202(f) (1982)). 
163. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1056; see also id. at 1067-68 (Bork, J., dissenting). 
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pretation. But both she and the Chevron Court have failed to 
realize that even if the practice is proved, it is no guarantee of 
congressional intent. The intent of the legislature is that which 
was intended by the Congress that enacted the legislation in 
question, not the subsequent bodies that may have acquiesced 
in a certain interpretation put forth by the agency. 
One reason to look at consistent interpretations of agencies 
or courts is the likelihood that they build up expectations. This 
is one of the concerns underlying stare decisis, and may be 
strong enough to override an otherwise better interpretation. 
But in this case there was no reliance on past decisions. Even 
if the agency had engaged in previous exclusions, the alien 
denied a visa and the citizens who invited her have in no way 
relied upon the agency's position. The only form of reliance that 
might have been posited was that the agency relied on the 
statute in not seeking a new basis fkom the legislature to au- 
thorize its behavior. If the agency interpretation had been 
reversed, it would have merely required the agency to make a 
request for legislative action at a time later than it should have 
made. A better rationale for discovery of past practice would 
have been that the court must assure itself that the agency% 
interpretation is of some weight because it has been interpret- 
ed that way consistently over a series of administrations. How- 
ever, that relates to the due deference criteria and not a deter- 
mination of congressional intent. 
Although consideration of the agency's interpretation is 
part of the Chevron formula, the issue of due deference may be 
at the crux of the problem in adjudication of statutory construc- 
tion issues. As Judge Posner recently wrote, "the canon that 
the interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency 
that enforces it is entitled to  great weight by the courts"'" 
rests on "an unrealistic view of the political process."'65 Ac- 
cording to Judge Posner, "[tlhere is no reason to expect adrnin- 
istrative agency members, appointed and confirmed long after 
the enactment of the legislation they are enforcing, to display a 
special fidelity to the original intent of the legislation rather 
than to the current policies of the Administration and the Con- 
gre~s ." '~~ Judge Posner recommends that a current agency 
interpretation not be given any particular weight unless the 
164. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 810. 
165. Id. at 810-11. 
166. Id. 
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interpretation has persisted through several changes of Admin- 
istration.lB7 Thus, one can conclude that Judge Posner views 
an agency's interpretation as suspect unless it has withstood 
the test of time, which appears to be the case here. 
I surmise that Judge Ginsburg viewed the agency's inter- 
pretation in Abourezk as suspect as well-as indeed it was. 
This is particularly true here because in at least one of the 
cases, the consular officer abroad had originally denied the visa 
under subsection 28,'" a waivable basis for exclusion under 
the McGovern Amendment. When the advisory opinion was 
issued by the DOS, the consular official was informed that 
subsection 27 should be the basis for denial because foreign 
policy considerations were implicated. Under subsection 27, no 
such waivable basis for exclusion is available. And so the plot 
thickens. 
Mter former President Reagan took office in 1981, the 
Administration began using subsections 27, 28, and 29 of sec- 
tion 212(a) of the INA on a much wider scale.lBg Administra- 
tion officials routinely cited "foreign policy reasons," and occa- 
sionally stated that they did not want to provide "a propaganda 
platform" in the United States for the excluded indi~iduals.'~~ 
Then Secretary of State, George Schultz, remarked on the 
Borge visa denial: "As a general proposition I think we have to  
favor freedom of speech, but it can get abused by people who do 
not wish us well, and I think we have to take some reasonable 
precautions about that."l7l This statement definitely indicates 
an intent to impede the free flow of ideas across international 
borders. 
Although certain policies of a particular Administration 
may be suspect, the Reagan administration was not the only 
167. Id. at  811. But in Abourezk, the government had submitted evidence dem- 
onstrating that its interpretation had been applied consistently, albeit infrequently, 
by subsequent administrations. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 885 11.14 
(D.D.C. 1984) (citing examples of several different administrations excluding aliens 
for foreign policy reasons). 
168. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in the case 
of Nino Pasti). 
169. A L E ~ o F F  & -TIN, supm note 75, at  204; see also Nathan M. Eider, 
Note, First Amendment and the Alien Exclusion Power-What Standard of Review?, 
4 CARDOZO L. REV. 457 (1983); D i o ~ e ,  Issue and Debate: Barring Aliens for Politi- 
cal Reasons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1983. 
170. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 75, at 204. 
171. Atkinson, Congressmen, Others Denounce Denial of Visas to US. Critics, 
THE WASH. PO=, Dec. 3, 1983, at A12. 
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administration that has denied entry to foreign nationals for 
dubious political rea~0ns. l~~ Also, notwithstanding particular 
administration policies, agencies may, nonetheless, know more 
than the courts about the legislation they implement.'" This 
is an appropriate rationale for giving an agency's interpretation 
reasonable deference, as now mandated by Chevron. "[Tlo the 
extent [agencies] support their interpretation with reasons at 
least plausibly based on superior knowledge the courts should 
give that interpretation weight."174 Although the particular 
evidence available in this case is sparse on prior practice, what 
was offered by the government's affidavits would seem t o  sup- 
port a consistent interpretati~n.'~~ 
Admittedly, the statutory issues in Abourezk are complex. 
Essentially, the term "activities" is clear enough as to  its literal 
meaning;'76 and the legislative history, as stated earlier, is 
inconclusive at best or indeed may even suggest an "activities" 
based exclusion mind-set. Only because the agency has inter- 
preted the term to  include "entry or mere presence" does the 
pertinent issue of statutory construction even arise in this case. 
The language in subsection 27 is broad and sweeping in scope. 
Further this was not the first time that the agency had given 
such a construction to the term.'77 Moreover, there are no 
guarantees that a judge is a more competent "surveyor[] of 
[the] legal topography" than the agency to which Congress has 
charged the implementation of its statutes.'" 
The example which the Government gave most readily to 
justify this interpretation at the time involved the Shah of Iran 
and the resulting take-over of the American embassy and the 
hostage crisis in 1979.'" Of course this event took place 
172. Alexander Wohl, Free Speech and the Right of Entry into the United 
States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the Immigm- 
tion and Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U .  J. IN13L L. & POL'Y, 443, 459 & n.72 (1989) 
(detailing "a wide range of individuals in a variety of fields* affected by visa deni- 
als). 
173. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supm note 124, at 811. 
174. Id. 
175. Government Brief at 6-7, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (No. 86- 
656). 
176. The term "activities* is defined primarily as "1. the state or quality of 
being active; the state of acting; action; doing." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 15 (unabridged ed. 1981). 
177. Government Brief at 12 n.8, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (No. 
86-656). 
178. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 381. 
179. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (D.D.C. 1984). 
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many years after enactment of the legislation in question and 
subsection 27 did not serve as a basis for exclusion of the Shah 
because he was eventually admitted. For the adherents of the 
school of dynamic statutory interpretation, this information has 
its appeal. As noted below, this very example figured promi- 
nently in the most recent amendments to the INA designed to 
re-craft a "foreign policy" exclusion ground.lgO Nonetheless, 
the critical issue here is whether the agency's interpretation of 
the statutory provision can take precedence over the plain or 
literal meaning of the statutory language and the apparent 
leaning of the legislative history towards the plaintiffs' posi- 
tion. The answer to the foregoing question should have been, 
perhaps surprisingly, in the affirmative. 
In refusing to  resolve the "activity/mere entry" question on 
the record before it (favorable to the government) and remand- 
ing the case to  the district court for further proceedings (consis- 
tent with its decision), the divided Court of Appeals failed to 
comply with the Chevron mandate, to wit, to  defer to a reason- 
able agency construction of the statutory provision in question. 
This should have been the court's focus on appeal but it was 
not. Under the circumstances and in most situations, the 
search for congressional intent can be exhaustive, frustrating, 
illusive and entirely capable of result-oriented judicial out- 
comes. So, if other agendas were at work here, because the 
majority is not entirely candid about its decision, what did the 
remand accomplish for the parties and the courts? The over- 
whelming evidence connected t o  the remand of this case sug- 
gests that little was in fact accomplished other than the need- 
less consumption of limited judicial resources in an effort to 
avoid the inevitable exclusions. 
As noted above, a divided Court of Appeals vacated the 
district court's judgment in Abourezk and remanded it for fur- 
ther proceedings consistent with its opinion.lgl The case pro- 
ceeded before the district court under the terms of the Court of 
Appeals' remand.lg2 The district court stated that the consoli- 
dated cases were remanded to it to decide two issues. The first 
issue related to the "activity/mere entry" dichotomy and the 
180. See infia notes 217-29 and accompanying text concerning the legislative 
history accompanying the 1990 amendments of INA 5 212(a). 
181. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
182. Abourezk v. Reagan, Nos. 83-3739, 83-3895, 1988 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5203, 
at *4 (D.D.C. June 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). 
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second related to the relationship between subsection 27 and 
subsection 28, particularly the relationship of the McGovern 
Amendment to the latter provision. All parties had agreed at  
the outset that the "public interest[,] . . . welfare, safety, or  
security" language is sufficiently broad to include foreign policy 
concerns.lss So another obstacle to  agency deference was con- 
structed. 
Subsequent to  the remand, the district court afforded the 
government an opportunity to  present additional evidence of 
congressional acquiescence as mandated by the Court of Ap- 
-peals. The district court concluded that the government had 
failed in its task. Although the government had presented some 
new evidence of an administrative practice, acquiesced in by 
Congress, to support its interpretation of subsection 27, the 
district court found that the additional evidence was "only 
imperceptibly more weighty than it was when the cases were 
before the Court in 1984."lg4 Furthermore, the district court 
read the appellate court's majority opinion as a mandate to 
enter judgment for plaintiffs unless the government could satis- 
fy this inquiry. As such, the district court found against the 
government on the first issue. 
As to  the second issue concerning the relationship between 
subsection 27 and subsection 28 of the INA and the McGovern 
Amendment which modified the latter but not the former, the 
focus of the district court's inquiry was on whether the visa 
denials in these consolidated cases were based on a threat to 
the public interest, etc., "independent of the fact of membership 
in or afE1iation with the . . . [proscribed] organization" set forth 
in subsection 28. Because the appellate court had concluded 
that the government could not satisfy this inquiry by the mere 
assertion that the reason for exclusion was in addition to and 
not independent of the fact of membership in such an organiza- 
tion, the district court likewise found against the government 
on the second issue.185 
Although the McGovern Amendment did not alter the 
provisions of subsection 27 in any manner, this additional re- 
quirement created by the judiciary virtually guaranteed an ad- 
verse decision for the government on remand. Notwithstanding 
the fact that exclusion grounds are separate and independent 
183. Id. at *4 n.7. 
184. Id. at *14-*15. 
185. Id. at *16. 
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grounds of exclusion and that an alien may be subject t o  exclu- 
sion on more than one ground, the judiciary's determination on 
this issue required their connection. On the parties' cross-mo- 
tions for summary judgment, the district court then granted 
the plaintiffs' motion and denied the government's motion. The 
court specifically noted that the plaintiffs (nearly five years 
after the original fling) were still anxious to have the four 
aliens-who were equally anxious (apparently)--come to  the 
United States to  fulfill their speaking engagements?' There- 
fore, the court ordered that appropriate entry visas be issued to  
the four aliens. The court, however, lacked the requisite statu- 
tory authority to order such action. Not surprisingly, the case 
went up on appeal once again.''' 
On the second round of review (now a year later), a differ- 
ent appellate panel found that only one of the consolidated 
cases that comprised the original Abourezk u. Reagan case (now 
called City of New York u. Baker) presented a live controversy. 
In that remaining case, the appellate court held that the dis- 
trict court, in ordering the issuance of the visa, had exceeded 
its authority. As a result, the case was remanded to the district 
court once again for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
the appellate court's opinion. 
Although the second time around the appellate court did 
not, in effect, overrule the earlier panel's decision in this case, 
subsequent and intervening events rendered much of the earli- 
er case moot. The significance of the much-heralded majority's 
decision in the original Abourezk case was severely under- 
mined. These subsequent events also underscored the clear 
political nature of the agency decisions rendered in these cases. 
As discussed more fully below, Congress intervened as well. 
The events following the district court's decision on remand 
included, among other political acts, the passage of the 
"Moylllhan-Frank Amendment,"'88 which Congress enacted 
subsequent to  the challenged visa denials. The Amendment 
established a general prohibition against the exclusion of aliens 
because of beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged 
in by a United States citizen in the United States, would be 
186. Id. at *22 n.29. 
187. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
188. Pub. L. No. 100-204, 901(a), 100 Stat. 1400-01 (as extended by Pub. L. 
No. 100-461, 555(a), 102 Stat. 2268-36 to -37 (1988)), popularly referred to as the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987, as modified in 1988. 
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protected under the U.S. Consti t~tion. '~~ While the govern- 
ment took an  appeal on the merits in Abourezk u. Reagan,lgo 
the first of the three consolidated cases, it appealed only the 
scope of the district court's order in the remaining two 
cases'g' because it had concluded that the Amendment pro- 
hibited exclusion of these aliens on the bases initidly asserted 
under subsection 28. Another subsequent event formally dis- 
posed of the Abourezk case. 
C. Presidential Proclamations 
On October 22, 1988, President Reagan issued a presiden- 
tial proclamation which specifically prohibited "officers and 
employees of the Government of Nicaragua" from entering the 
United States as temporary visitors.'gz Accordingly, the par- 
ties agreed that this proclamation constituted "an independent 
intervening cause for future exclusions of Tomas Borge, the 
Interior Minister of Nicaragua," who was the subject of the visa 
denial in the original Abourezk u. Reagan.'" Thereafter, the 
appellate court dismissed the appeal in Abourezk u. Reagan 
and instructed the district court to vacate its judgment and 
dismiss that case on mootness grounds.lg4 
Three years earlier, President Reagan had issued a presi- 
dential proclamation which, presumably, should have disposed 
of the second case involving the Cuban foreign nationals.1g5 
Section 1 of the Proclamation states: 
Entry of the following classes of Cuban nationals as  
nonimmigrants is hereby suspended: (a) officers or employees 
of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba 
holding diplomatic or official passports; and (b) individuals 
who, notwithstanding the type of passport that they hold, are 
189. Id. 
190. Civil Action No. 83-3739. 
191. City of New York v. Baker, Civil Action No. 83-3741 and Cronin v. Bak- 
er, Civil Action No. 83-3895. 
192. Proclamation No. 5887, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,185 (1988). 
193. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 509 0 .C.  Cir. 1989) (citing 
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) for the proposition that 
a "case becomes moot if neither party has [a] legally cognizable interest in [the] 
final determination of factual and legal questions"). 
194. Id (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)). 
195. Proclamation No. 5377, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,329 (1985), entitled "Suspension of 
Entry as Non-Immigrants by Officers or Employees of the Government of Cuba or 
the Communist Party of Cuba," was signed by President Reagan on October 4, 
1985. 
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considered by the Secretary of State or his designee to be 
officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Com- 
munist Party of Cuba.lg6 
In the Court of Appeals' earlier opinion in this case, the 
majority noted that "[ilf this Proclamation covers Finlay and 
Lezcano, the President's directive might constitute an indepen- 
dent intervening cause for future exclusions, and thus render 
the City of New York case moot" in constitutional terms.lg7 
But like the issue of administrative practice and congressional 
acquiescence, the appellate court the first time around found 
the record on the mootness issue inadequate as well. Similarly, 
the impact of this issue was left to be resolved on remand to 
the district court.'" On remand, however, the district court 
did not consider the mootness issue.199 
Over appellees' technical objections, the Court of Appeals, 
in agreement with the government this time around, deter- 
mined that the controversy over Lezcano's visa denial under 
subsection 27 was no longer viable and therefore dismissed the 
case as moot.200 The court, on the other hand, rejected the 
government's contention that the "Moynihan-Frank Amend- 
ment" had, a t  least, rendered the Cronin case "prudentially 
moot." The basis for this rejection was the conclusion that this 
Amendment did not address the "activitylentry" distinction 
originally raised in Abourezk v. Reagan.201 And because the 
government had not renounced its earlier position on this issue, 
it remained possible for the Secretary of State to deny a future 
visa application fled by Nino Pasti, the former member of the 
Italian Senate who had been denied originally on the basis of 
his membership in the World Peace Council which, according to  
the DOS, was an instrumentality of the former Soviet govern- 
ment. Thus, the court declined to dismiss the case but did hold 
eventually that the district court had exceeded its authority 
when it ordered the issuance of a visa to Pasti. On appeal, the 
court vacated that portion of the district court's order and re- 
196. Id. 
197. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 @.C. Cir. 1986). 
198. Id. 
199. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
200. Id. The court had already acknowledged that since Finlay had died in the 
interim, only Lezcano's right to a visa remained at issue in this case. Id. at 509. 
201. Id. at 511. 
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manded (again) for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
the court's opinion.202 
Given the new world (political) order, it is doubtful that 
there are presently, or will be in the foreseeable future, much 
call for speakers at nuclear rally protests. Further, with the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union, concern regarding membership in former Soviet 
instrumentalities has no doubt declined appreciably. Thus, in  
the future Nino Pasti should have no difficulty visiting this 
country. Again, this observation underscores the largely politi- 
cal nature of the government's actions in this case, leaving for 
the two political branches of government, Congress and the 
Executive Branch, to strike an  appropriate balance ("deal") 
policy-wise. 
D. The Relevance of Subsequent Amendments to 
the Critique on the Judicial Process 
Subsequent to the original appellate decision in Abourezk, 
Congress took a number of steps to liberalize visa denial poli- 
cies based on political beliefs. First, Congress passed temporary 
provisions to ease the restrictions on free speech activities.203 
These first steps at reform, however, only partially ameliorated 
the harsh exclusion provisions of an "anachronistic immigration 
s t a t ~ t e . " ~ ~  They were piecemeal legislative tinkering that 
never f d y  addressed the issues raised by litigation. Finally, it 
took a thorough overhaul of the INA to bring about the much 
needed changes in  these provisions nearly nine years after the 
final report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Ref- 
ugee Policy which had recommended substantial immigration 
reform proposals. Interestingly, the Select Commission, which 
otherwise advanced reform proposals for a comprehensive over- 
haul of the INA, "ducked the thorny political controversies that 
might be involved in recasting the grounds of exclusion."205 
This observation further underscores the political nature of the 
debate and why courts should not try to tackle these "thorny 
202. Id. at 512. 
203. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-201, $ 901(a), 101 
Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987), modified by Pub. L. No. 100-461, $ 555, 102 Stat. 2268 
(1988), Pub. L. No. 101-246, 8 128, 104 Stat. 15, 30 (1990). 
. 204. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMUIMIGRATION FUNDAMEN- 
TALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 74 (3d ed. 1994). 
205. ALEINKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 75, at 183. 
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political controversies." Of course, that does not mean they 
should remain silent. For example, in Lennon u. INS?06 the 
court commented that the exclusion provisions listed in the 
INA constitute "a magic mirror, reflecting the fears and con- 
cerns of past Congres~es."~~' More recently, Judge Sterling 
Johnson in the Second Circuit lamented that his hands, in 
effect, were tied due to  congressional inaction and excoriated 
the Executive Branch for the harshness of its (unconscionable) 
policy on Haitian refugees.z0s 
After addressing illegal immigration in 1986, Congress 
used the occasion of a comprehensive revision to the INA, 
namely the Immigration Act of 1990,209 to totally revamp the 
security-related exclusion grounds. If statutory interpretation 
has as its goal an attempt to reflect the current societal and 
political context, the changes made during that legislative ses- 
sion reveal an agency acting out of step with the times. But 
fmt, in 1987, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authori- 
zation Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, which suspended until 
March 1, 1989, sections of the INA that had prohibited admis- 
sion into the United States because of beliefs or associations, or 
the anticipated content of statements made by a noncitizen 
while in the United States.210 Unlike the McGovern Amend- 
ment which extended only to  foreign nationals entering on 
temporary visits, this Authorization Act extended to those seek- 
ing to immigrate on a permanent basis. 
In the Act of October 1, 1988?11 which extended section 
901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for two years, 
Congress restricted its application to nonimmigrants only. The 
206. 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975). 
207. Id. at 189. 
208. Haitian Centers Council Inc. v. McNary, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8452, *4- 
*5 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992). 
209. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
210. Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1988 
and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987), provided in rel- 
evant part: 
(a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
alien may be denied a visa or excluded from admission into the United 
States, subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United 
States, or subject to deportation because of any past, current, or expected 
beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United 
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Consti- 
tution of the United States. 
211. Foreign Operations Appropriations Ad, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 5 555, 102 
Stat. 2268, 2268-36 and 2268-37 (1988). 
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temporary change did not apply to  denials of visas or admission 
based on foreign policy considerations or national security as 
long as those exclusions were not based on beliefs or activities 
protected by the Cons t i tu t i~n .~~  This aspect of the legislative 
initiative is similar to the Abourezk majority's insistence that 
there be no overlap between exclusion grounds. But unlike the 
legislative measure, the judicial requirement lacked legislative 
authority. Still it fits a dynamic approach to statutory interpre- 
tation. 
In early 1990, Congress made this restricted section 901 
permanent.213 The new legislation, in effect, permanently pro- 
hibited the government from barring foreign nationals from 
entering the country on a temporary basis because of their 
political beliefs. In signing the bill, then President Bush stated 
that he was not bound by several provisions in the measure 
that limited his authority to  conduct foreign  relation^.^" In 
fact, a news item at the time reported that a senior official had 
told the Washington Post that "the administration [was] con- 
sidering suing Congress to  test the constitutionality of some 
 provision^."'^ 
Later that year, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 
1990 which both broadened and narrowed the political and 
national security exclusion grounds.216 House conferees, in 
deciding on the appropriate amendments to these particular 
grounds, established a single provision authorizing the execu- 
tive branch to  exclude foreign nationals for foreign policy rea- 
sons in certain limited circumstances. Elements of the former 
subsections 27 and 29 were incorporated into new subsections 
3(A) and 3(B) of section 212(a). In so doing, the conferees stated 
as follows: 
Under current law there is some ambiguity as to the authori- 
ty of the Executive Branch to exclude aliens on foreign policy 
grounds (this ambiguity is a result of the overlapping nature 
of the basic grounds for exclusion as set out in Section 212(a) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Section 901 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 
212. Miranda, supra note 77, at 302. 
213. Pub. L. No. 101-246, $ 128(b), 104 Stat. 15, 30 (1990); see 67 Int. Rel. 
201 (1990). 
214. 67 Int. Rel. 202 (1990). 
215. Id 
216. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, L MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 341 (1992). 
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and 1989, as amended, and the "McGovern Amendment"). The 
foreign policy provision in this title would establish a single 
clear standard for foreign policy exclusions (which is designat- 
ed as  212(a)(3)(C) of the INA). The conferees believe that 
granting an alien admission to the United States is not a sign 
of approval or agreement and the conferees therefore expect 
that, with the enactment of this provision, aliens will be ex- 
cluded not merely because of the potential signal that might 
be sent because of their admission, but when there would be a 
clear negative foreign policy impact associated with their 
Thus, the legislative history of this newly crafted provision 
indicates that the executive branch is authorized to exclude 
aliens for foreign policy reasons in certain circumstances. These 
"certain circumstances" are described as those based on the 
reasonable belief held by the Secretary of State that an alien's 
entry or proposed activities within the United States would have 
potentially adverse foreign policy consequences.218 This aspect 
of the new measure's legislative history emphasizes the lack of 
distinction between the dichotomy that was previously litigat- 
ed. There are, however, two pertinently detailed exceptions 
covering officials (or electoral candidates for government office) 
of foreign governments and all other aliens when their exclu- 
sion implicates past, current or expected beliefs, statements or 
associations which would be la* in the United  state^.^" 
217. H.R. COW. REP. NO. 955, 10lst. Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29 (1990) (emphasis 
added). 
218. Id. at 129. 
219. Id. As to the first exception involving foreign government officials or those 
candidates seeking election to a foreign government office, the legislative history 
specifically contemplates that such foreign nationals would not be excludable under 
the foreign policy provision "solely because of any past, current or expected beliefs, 
statements or associations which would be lawful in the United States." Id. To 
further underscore the importance of this exception, the Conference Report states: 
The word "solely" is used in this provision to indicate that, in cases in- 
volving government officials, the committee intends that exclusions not be 
based merely on, for example, the possible content of an alien's speech in 
this country, but that there be some clear foreign policy impad beyond 
the mere fad of the speech or its content, that would permit exclusion. 
Id. 
As to the second exception concerning all other aliens, the government is re- 
quired to demonstrate a compelling United States foreign policy interest, attested 
to by the personal opinion of the Secretary of State and certified to  the relevant 
Congressional oversight committees, if first amendment activities are implicated. 
Recall that this was essentially the district court's view in the first round of 
litigation involving Abourezk v. Reagan. But that court had concluded, aRer an in 
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Admittedly, the subsequent amendments are relevant to 
this critique because they support the fact that congressional 
update of the anachronistic exclusion provisions-the subject of 
much litigation-was hotly debated and well overdue. However, 
the legislative history, as found in the Conference Report dis- 
cussed above, underscores the strictly political nature of this 
inquiry. More important, the political contours of the inquiry 
and the need for compromise between the political branches 
highlights the rationale for allowing such updating, putting 
aside the issue of legitimacy of evolutive theories of interpreta- 
tion and legislative supremacy, to occur in the political forum 
with the advice, counsel and input of the administration agen- 
cies and the executive branch along with interested individuals 
(i.e., lobbyists). 
For example, the legislative history refers to the American 
hostage incident involving the Shah of Iran for not making the 
"activitylentry" distinction as part of the policy rationale. Al- 
though it used this as an  example of a compelling U.S. foreign 
policy interest, it adds to the weight of evidence indicating the 
reasonableness of the agency's position on the interpretive 
issue in this case. 
As noted above, elements of the former subsections 27 and 
29 appear in newly-cratted subsections under section 212(a). 
There is, however, "a rough relationship" between former sub- 
section 28 and the new subsection 3(D) of section 212(a), which 
covers immigrant members of totalitarian parties.220 For 
nonimmigrants, the new amendments contain no exclusion 
ground analogous to former section 212(a)(28).221 For immi- 
camera inspection which the majority in the appellate case had criticized, that the 
confidential information had satisfactorily indicated that this was more than just 
the possible content of the speeches. As stated then, "an alien invited to impart in- 
formation and ideas to American citizens in circumstances such as these may not 
be excluded under subsection (27) solely on account of the content of his proposed 
message." Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D.D.C. 1984). 
220. For a fuller discussion describing these new provisions, see LEGOMSKY, su- 
pra note 216, at 342. 
221. As Professor Legomsky notes: 
Given the limits that sedion 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Ad had already placed on old subsection 28, however, the omission of an 
analogous nonimmigrant exclusion ground is probably not a significant 
change. Virtually all the activities mentioned in subsection 28-advocacy, 
publication, party membership, etc.-would be protected under the 
Brandenburg test unless they were calculated to incite, and likely to in- 
cite, imminent lawless action. In that latter event, the alien would gener- 
ally be excludable under new subsection 3(AXii) in any event. 
186 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
grants, however, the exclusion grounds have been 
narrowed.222 Visa applicants seeking permanent admission 
may still be denied on the basis of their political member- 
sh ip~ .~= 
Finally, the new legislation repealed both section 901 of 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989, as amended, and the McGovern Amendment and re- 
moved membership in or affiliation with the communist party 
as a ground for exclusion of n~nimmigrants.~~ With this later 
act, prior practice under the McGovern Amendment requiring 
nonimmigrants who were otherwise excludable under former 
subsection 28 to go through an "automatic" waiver process was 
necessarily dis~ontinued.~~ 
Section 2 l2(a)(3)(C), the newly-crafted provision, carving 
out a single provision for foreign policy exclusions, was de- 
signed to alleviate legitimate concerns that former subsection 
27 was being used to  exclude aliens on the basis of their be- 
liefs, statements, or associations. This new foreign policy provi- 
sion also sets forth, ostensibly, a clear standard for such exclu- 
sions and the circumstances under which they would be ap- 
propriate. This is the likely end result of a "negotiated" compro- 
mise between the legislative and executive branches of govern- 
ment. 
It is doubtful that if the courts had taken a dynamic ap- 
proach to  statutory interpretation, a similar outcome as the one 
reached through legislative compromise could have been 
achieved. This issue was admittedly "an especially sensitive 
issue for Congress's con~ideration."~~ So, with the benefit of 
hindsight, one could conclude that courts engaging in the pro- 
cess of interpreting statutes should not be adjudged by the 
temper of the times. Instead, consistent with the doctrine of 
legislative supremacy, courts should await appropriate modern- 
ization of statutes in the political arena even though the wait 
LEGOMSKY, supra note 216, at 342 (cross reference omitted). 
222. Id. 
223. New INA subsection 3(DXi) includes some of the aliens previously covered 
by former subsection 28. Specifically, new subsection 3 0 x 3  covers associations but 
not advocacy, publication, etc. It covers only associations with "the Communist or 
any other totalitarian party" and not associations with other groups once regarded 
as subversive under the old law. See INA $ 212(a)(28XI)(ii) (1982). 
224. H.R. COW. REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1990). 
225. Id. 
226. ALEINIKOPF & MARTIN, supra note 28, at 327. 
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may be a long one. But, more importantly, it is very doubtful 
that this relatively recent statutory change could have been 
accomplished prior to the concomitant change in the political 
world order. As noted by commentators in the field, "[tlhe 1990 
Act completes the work with regard t o  ideological exclusion, 
providing generous waivers of excludability for former Commu- 
nist party members and permitting only limited exclusion 
based on foreign policy considerations for other aliens whose 
political ideas or affiliations are a matter of concern."227 This 
compromise no doubt reflects not only the new world order but 
a growing belief or acceptance that there may no longer be a 
clear divide between what is foreign and what is domestic poli- 
~ y . ~ =  
Meanwhile, deference to the agency interpretation, if rea- 
sonable under the circumstances, should be the paramount 
guiding principle in cases such as this one. Such was not the 
case here, however. Instead, the Court of Appeals embarked 
upon an odyssey of interpretive subterfuge in an effort to  avoid 
the need to address the real considerations that should have 
guided its decision. Admittedly, the Supreme Court application 
of the Chevron doctrine over the years has been somewhat 
inconsistent and has failed to provide the lower courts with 
clear guidance as to  when a court should defer to an agency's 
construction of the statute.2zg But in this particular area of 
the law, little guidance is needed when it comes to the concept 
of agency deference. 
As discussed more fully below, the circumstances of the 
Abourezk case presented such considerations. Specifically the 
policy considerations attendant to immigration cases make 
deference practical. Moreover, as the district court in Abourezk 
had already observed, "in foreign affairs matters and those 
involving the admission of aliens, the political branches have 
the widest possible latitude in these respects."230 
227. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 204. 
228. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1980 (1993) (book review). 
229. Johnson, supra nate 32, at 422. 
230. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 886 n.19 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981)). Indeed, not one immigra- 
tion statute, it would appear, had ever been invalidated on such grounds. Id. 
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Applying traditional methods of statutory interpretation in 
viewing the language and legislative history of the statute, the 
agency's interpretation is admittedly not a very plausible one. 
But at this juncture of the process, reliance on traditional tools 
is not paramount because (a) they do not provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question posed and (b) there are several compli- 
cating factors involved in this case that should have prompted 
the court to  give more weight to the agency's position even 
though it thought another view more enlightened. Additionally, 
given the serious foreign policy ramifications following the 
Shah of Iran's admission to  the United States in the late 1970s, 
such an interpretation has a common sense appeal to  it. More- 
over, a focus on the reasonableness of the agency's viewpoint is 
all that Chevron requires. And, presumably, such a focus would 
have conserved limited judicial resources.231 Such an ap- 
proach or, more appropriately, focus on the court's part in the 
original appellate decision would have brought about finality to 
the saga of this case much earlier. And as the Court has indi- 
cated previously in Fiallo v. Bell, the matter should more ap- 
propriately be taken up with Congress. More importantly, such 
consideration would have been in keeping with the mandate of 
Chevron. 
In Abourezk Judge Ginsburg had elected, most likely, to  
follow the approach several appellate courts have adopted by 
giving Chevron a "weak" reading.232 To approve an adminis- 
231. This is apparently what the Committee on Immigration and Nationality 
Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York had in mind when it 
issued its 1985 report on visa denials based on ideological grounds: 
In 1984 Congress had again an opportunity to effect major revisions 
in this country's immigration laws.* * * But it would have left unscathed 
and largely unexamined the disturbing legacy of the McCarthy era that 
permits the denial of visas to the United States on ideological grounds. 
The controversy stirred by such denials may explain but does not excuse 
a failure to address the issue. In the hopes of encouraging the Legislature 
to confront the controversy when i t  next examines these laws, we recom- 
mend the repeal of sections 212(a)(27)-(29) of the Immigration and Nation- 
ality Ad,  and their replacement with language that reflects this country's 
values. 
Visa Denials, supm note 128, at 249-50 (footnotes omitted). 
232. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Re- 
view of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302 
(1988). In adopting such a reading of Chevron, the court resolves the ambiguities 
in the statute itself rather than applying the deference principle. Id.; see also, John 
F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuits Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive 
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trative construction a court "need not conclude that the agency 
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopt- 
ed . . . or even the reading the court would have reached if the 
question initially had arisen in a judicial pro~eeding."~~ All 
that a court need do is determine whether the agency's inter- 
pretation is reasonable under the circumstances once the court 
has concluded, after the application of the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, that the language is either silent on 
the particular interpretive issue or  ambiguous. 
More important, as Professor Diver has argued, "courts 
should presumptively defer to agency interpretations of stat- 
utes in situations where Congress has endowed the agency 
with significant policy-making resp~nsibility."~~ For those 
commentators who argue against "a blanket rule of deference 
to agency constructions whenever an agency charged with im- 
plementing a statute interprets it?" there are appropriate 
factors for employing the Chevron mandate here. As Professor 
Diver has remarked: "Since interpretation is inherently a form 
of policymaking, courts should presumptively defer to an 
agency's interpretation of a statute under which the agency 
exercises significant policymaking resp~nsibility."~~~ Such is 
the case here. The DOS is such an agency with si@icant 
authority in the issuance of visas under the immigration statu- 
tory scheme. 
A. The Foreign Affairs Power 
The principle of deference to the agency's interpretation 
applies with special force when a statute involves a delegation 
to the Executive of authority to make and implement decisions 
Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992) (pro- 
viding a basis for formulating a positive theory of the D.C. Circuit's behavior 
through an empirical examination of the court's use of the Chevron test). 
233. Chevron USA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.11 (1984); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("Me need not find 
that [the agency's] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the 
result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judi- 
cial proceedings.") (quoting Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 
(1946)); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US. 134, 140 (1944) ("[Tlhe rulings, interpre- 
tations and opinions of the [agency], while not controlling upon the courts by rea- 
son of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."). 
234. Diver, supra note 1, at  552. 
235. Callahan, supra note 57, at  1292. 
236. Diver, supra note 1, at  593. 
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relating to the conduct of foreign affairs. Not surprisingly, 
Judge Bork paid particular attention to  this aspect of the 
Abourezk case in his dissent.237 The Supreme Court has de- 
scribed the exclusion of aliens as "a fundamental act of sover- 
eignty," stating that "the right [to exclude] stems not alone 
from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to  
control the foreign affairs of the nation."2s8 Therefore, in its 
delegations of power in the area of foreign relations, Congress 
"must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it cus- 
tomarily wields in domestic areas,"23s and "[p]ractically every 
volume of the United States Statutes contains one o r  more 
acts . . . of Congress authorizing action by the President in 
respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either 
leave the exercise of the power to  his unrestricted judgment, or 
provide a standard far more general than that which has al- 
ways been considered requisite with regard to domestic af- 
f a i r ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The INA is one such statute. 
As for the discussion about subsection 27 and whether it 
authorizes the exclusion of aliens whose entry or presence in 
the United States raises foreign policy concerns not- 
withstanding the plain language of the statute that seemingly 
restricts activities only, the district court noted that the distinc- 
tion between an alien's activities and his presence in the Unit- 
ed States is one without a differen~e.~~' Any person admitted 
must engage in some activity in the United States, and entry 
alone can have dramatic effects on American foreign policy.* 
237. Judge Bork states in his dissent: 
Plaintiffs have chosen an especially inhospitable legal environment in 
which to attempt the resuscitation of the non-delegation doctrine, for it is 
in the context of foreign affairs that the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld the legitimacy of broad and discretionary Executive power. 
"[Blecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary inter- 
national relations, and the fad that the Executive is immediately privy to 
information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted 
upon by the legislature," statutes conferring authority upon the President 
to conduct foreign affairs have necessarily been less detailed and specitic 
than statutes concerned with domestic affairs. 
Abourezk v. Regan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J. dissenting) 
(citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). 
238. United States ex re!. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
239. Zernel, 381 U.S. at 17. 
240. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936). 
241. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 884 (D.D.C. 1984) (The court so 
concluded after putting the inquiry in context.). 
242. See, e.g., id. at 884-85 (discussing the impact of the admission of the 
1391 NATURE OF JUDICLAL DECISION-MAKING 191 
The district court observed that it would be a non sequitur to 
conclude that Congress meant to bar only those aliens who 
would engage in prejudicial activities, but admit those whose 
very entry would be prejudicial to  the public interest. 
Further, Subsection 29 argues against drawing such a 
distinction between entry and activities. Specifically, Congress 
limited this particular exclusionary provision to  conduct occur- 
ring "after entry." Thus, such a distinction would render sub- 
sections 27 and 29 largely duplicative. Such a result would 
offend the well-settled rule of construction that all parts of a 
statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect.243 Moreover, 
immigration grounds for exclusion are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
Finally, the extreme deference accorded the executive 
branch in this particular area of the law is another factor 
pointing to the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation of 
the statute. This is particularly appropriate because, as Profes- 
sor Sunstein once remarked, "[sltatutory construction is not a 
search for direct decision of precise questions. . . . Congress 
often doesn't foresee how its laws will be applied or what the 
particular circumstances will be."2u Here, such a distinction 
is unnecessary because the question of whether to  limit exclu- 
sion to activities or mere presence is a pure question of policy, 
given the nature of the sovereign's power in the area of admis- 
sions as discussed more fully below.245 
B. The Plenary Power Doctrine 
The context provided by the general field in which the 
legislation operates is another powerful interpretive tool. Here, 
Shah of Iran in 1979 which precipitated the taking of American hostages in Iran); 
see also Greenwald, supra note 30, a t  234-35. 
243. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 US. 609, 633 
(1973). 
244. K e ~ e t h  W. Starr et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a 
Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 368-69 (1987) (remarks of Professor 
Sunstein criticizing a broad reading of Chevron). Professor Sunstein specifically 
describes Chevron as a "thumb on the scales in favor of the agency." Id. a t  371; 
see also, Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (noting that "[iln an extraordinarily wide range of 
areas . . . Chevron has altered the distribution of national powers among courts, 
Congress, and administrative agencies"). According to Professor Sunstein, Chevron 
has become "a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbuy, for the administrative state." 
Id. 
245. Pierce, supra note 232, at 304. 
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Congress enacted legislation in an area where the federal gov- 
ernment has plenary powereu6 As a result, federal courts are 
generally reluctant to  scrutinize government action too closely 
in the area of immigration law when it involves those who seek 
admission to this country.z47 Furthermore, aliens found 
excludable on ideological grounds are not entitled to  any consti- 
tutional guarantees.248 The doctrine, frequently applied by 
the courts, has been universally criticized by legal commenta- 
tors as a means "to shield the executive branch's immigration 
decisions from meaningful judicial review."249 But note that 
the Court in Fiallo u. Bell did reserve a role for the judiciary 
should the political branches of government ever transgress the 
constitutional boundaries of their discretion in determining the 
nation's foreign policy goals and the means to achieve them. 
Congress and the executive branch of government have been 
particularly vigilant in avoiding such a constitutional contro- 
versy. The recent amendments to the INA7s grounds of exclu- 
sion are such examples. 
For those not indoctrinated with this notion of plenary 
power, the realization that an area of the law exists over which 
courts have little to adjudicate may seem anachronistic. In one 
of the early cases addressing the plenary power doctrine, Jus- 
tice Field wrote in The Chinese Exclusion Case250 that "[tlhe 
power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty 
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of 
those sovereign powers delegated by the Con~titution."'~ Ac- 
cording to Field the exclusion of these foreigners from our 
midst was "a proposition which we do not think open to contro- 
v e r ~ ~ . " ~ ' ~  The thrust of his concern is that "if [an independent 
nation] could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent 
246. See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 
WIS. L. REV. 965 ("The plenary power doctrine provides the backbone for our con- 
stitutional tradition affecting aliens, placing nearly unfettered authority with the 
political branches of the federal government."). 
247. See id. at 967 n.7 ("The plenary power doctrine is a judicial creation by 
which the Court severely limits its role in resolving immigration 
exalting the role played by Congress and the executive branch."). 
248. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
(1972). 
249. Johnson, supra note 32, a t  443. 
250. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
251. Id. at 609. 
252. Id. at 603. 
issues, while 
408 U.S. 753 
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subject to the control of another power."25s Three years later 
in Nishimura Ekiu u. United States:% the Court described 
the doctrine in terms of "an accepted maxim of international 
law."255 
These oft-cited passages referring to the inherent power of 
the sovereign to  exclude aliens leave open a number of ques- 
tions about the nature of the source of the federal power to 
enact and to regulate immigration laws. Both confusion and 
concern exist as to the constitutional source of this power, our  
republic being a union whose government exercises only those 
powers which are enumerated in the Constitution-and such 
implied powers as are necessary and proper. It is generally 
accepted that the power to regulate the flow of aliens over our 
borders is inherent in the concept of sovereignty.256 Thus, by 
virtue of the inherent authority of the executive in foreign 
affairs matters, coupled with the plenary power doctrine, judi- 
cial review in this particular area of immigration law is usually 
a somewhat restrictive activity, a limitation that undoubtedly 
causes much consternation amongst activist judges. 
The majority in Abourezk, consistent with this reasoning, 
concluded that Congress intended foreign policy concerns to 
rank among the national interests whose protection would 
justify exclusion of an alien under subsection 27.257 According 
to the majority, "the broad language of subsection 27 evince[d] 
no intent to restrict the kinds of governmental concerns that 
would qualify; the subsection speaks of 'public interest[,] . . . 
welfare, safety, or security' and places no limitation on these 
encompassing terms.'a58 In Judge Ginsburg's opinion, "[olnly 
an isolationist view patently inconsistent with the reality of our 
late twentieth century world could account for a belief that the 
'public interest' and the 'national welfare' did not depend, in 
253. Id. at 604. 
254. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
255. Id. 
256. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1972) (noting 
that "the dif£iculty of locating a constitutional source for the foreign affairs power 
probably produced the unique theory expressed that the foreign affairs powers 
derive not from the Constitution at all, but rather are inherent in the notion of a 
sovereign nation"). 
257. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1043, 1053 @.C. Cir. 1986), affd per 
curium, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). Up to this point, the majority was in agreement with 
the district court's analysis. 
258. Id. 
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part, on the effective execution of our foreign policy.'n5g Fur- 
ther, Judge Ginsburg exhorted the court not to  adopt such "a 
counterintuitive interpretation of expansive statutory Ian- 
guage." Judge Ginsburg also noted that the plaintiffs had not 
identified anything in the legislative history or administrative 
practice t o  suggest that Congress intended to  exclude foreign 
policy concerns from consideration under subsection (27).260 
In light of this discourse, the majority need not have embarked 
upon the next analytical inquiry under the Chevron test. 
In discussing the foregoing principles at the outset, Judge 
Bork assigned them great weight because of their conclusive 
effect on the outcome of this case. According to  Bork, the major- 
ity opinion failed to  give the requisite weight to  them.261 Sim- 
ilarly, I view such a discussion as critical to  a well-reasoned 
opinion in an immigration case, given the nature of the inher- 
ent authority of the government in this area of the law. Adjudi- 
cating these cases out of their historical context may cause a 
court to lose sight of the correct task at hand and possibly give 
way to  the temptation to substitute its own judgment. 
When coupled with the inherent power of the sovereign to  
exclude aliens,262 which is so "intricately interwoven" with 
the conduct of foreign policy, 2aa contrary conclusion requires 
clear authority to overcome the plenary nature of the 
government's power. Otherwise, such an intrusion on the Exec- 
utive would be unwarranted. And because this authority does 
not stem alone from the "legislative power but is inherent in 
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the na- 
t i ~ n , " ~ ~ ~  courts should, therefore, hesitate before making such 
an intrusion which, in effect, limits or embarrasses such pow- 
e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  
However, by recognizing the need to  give deference to the 
government because of the nature of its authority in this area, 
I do not intend, by any means, t o  imply that I accept the 
government's approach as a matter of policy. As practitioners 
noted in their call for legislative reform of these ideological 
Id. at 1053. 
Id. 
Id. at 1064. 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 (1952). 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915). 
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grounds of exclusion "to remove that shadow of hypocrisy and 
to  affirm the principles underlying our Bill or  Rights": 
While our intellectual and political life is damaged, these 
exclusion provisions also mar our moral image, here and 
abroad. They cannot be reconciled with our role as signatory 
to an international agreement intended to encourage the free 
exchange of ideas and movement of citizens, or with our con- 
demnation of injustices in other countries.266 
Note also that these practitioners "lobbied" Congress, not the 
courts, to  repeal the controversial ideological grounds of exclu- 
~ i o n . ~ ~ '  And in a more philosophical vain, a single practitio- 
ner representing an individual in a deportation case involving 
one of these ideological grounds noted the following: 
There is a fundamental tension between the desire to be free 
individuals and the desire to be part of a community that 
defines itself through ffirming particular substantive values. 
That tension is encapsulated in the First Amendment, which 
suggests that our nation's primary substantive value is gov- 
ernment neutrality in the sphere of substantive values. But 
too much freedom threatens our sense of community. The 
McCarran-Walter Act thus sets the boundaries for our free- 
dom. But a t  what price? It  affirms our faith in democracy by 
casting out people who believe in other systems of govern- 
ment. I t  affirms our faith in pluralism by barring from our 
borders anyone who is perceived as advocating totalitarian- 
ism. I t  privileges narrow nationalist self-definition over the 
uninhibited exchange of ideas, which is itself one of our most 
important freedoms. I t  promotes "freedom" by denying the 
h d a m e n t a l  humanity of another human being. The question 
that the McCarran-Walter Act raises is whether a country 
can ever call itself pluralist or humanist when it expels and 
excludes persons like [Margaret] Randall because they hold 
dissenting points of view?68 
Given an academic's role, notwithstanding our own politi- 
cal views, it is not inappropriate for us to criticize the judicial 
process. I view judges' roles, however, quite differently. In that 
role, other considerations come into play and, therefore, re- 
266. Visa Denials, supra note 128, at 264. 
267. Id. at 249-50. 
268. David Cole, What's A Metaphor?: The Deportation of A Poet, 1 YALE J.L. 
& LIB. 10 (1989). 
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strain their conduct. This is not to  suggest that judges cannot 
express their criticism of a particular policy in their opin- 
i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  This is part of the process of engaging in judicial can- 
dor. Ultimately such candor can inform the legislative process. 
VI. A WORD ON JUDICIAL CANDOR AND 
INTERPRETIVE SUBTERFUGE 
Abourezk raises starkly the issue of judicial candor. Nei- 
ther opinion can be read without a strong suspicion that other 
agendas were animating the writers' hands while couched in 
originalist rhetoric. Both opinions announce allegiance to the 
guiding principles of Chevron then take off in entirely different 
directions of analysis. To the extent that there are overlapping 
areas of accord, they are explained away. This is not necessari- 
ly surprising because, as some commentators have observed, 
appellate courts tend to give Chevron either a strong or weak 
reading which allows them to, in effect, dictate the outcome of 
a particular case while maintaining the appearance of 
legitirna~y.~'~ 
As stated earlier, immigration is an area of the law in 
which the judiciary's role is perceived as quite limited.271 Ac- 
cording to commentators, it is an area in which constitutional 
enlightenment has not taken a substantial hold.272 AS such, 
the temptation to do 'justice" and uphold the traditional con- 
stitutional values of this society is very great. 
But in today's legal climate, rare is the occasion that a 
jurist must succumb to this temptation. In his article on judi- 
cial candor, Professor Shapiro observes that in modern society 
we aspire to  be j ~ s t . ~ "  Although questions of morality may 
profoundly affect the dynamic nature of the decision-making 
process in certain cases, "the judge's allegiance t o  both law and 
269. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 837-41 @.C. 
Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
270. See, e.g., Pierce, supm note 232, at 307, 310-12 (Such activity is tanta- 
mount to "judicial resolution of [a policy issue] through a process disguised as 
statutory interpretation."). 
271. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977). 
272. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 19; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, 
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7  CON^. COMM. 9 (1990); Schuck, supra 
note 2. 
273. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 
750 (1987) (noting that in today's legal climate, we are not faced with the kind of 
social dilemmas that plagued our society in earlier years); see id. at  749 n.86. 
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candor must be considered in determining his moral 
For Professor Shapiro, judges have an absolute moral duty t o  
candor in rendering their opinions. Candor is thus a part of the 
judiciary fundioning responsibly.275 So when faced with a 
temptation to  do justice in a particular case, a judge cannot 
escape her predicament "by concluding that the legal right 
itself is a function of whatever morality requires."276 Accord- 
ing to Professor Shapiro, "a judge's fidelity to  law can be fairly 
measured only if judges believe what they say in their opinions 
and orders.'n77 In other words, judges should be more forth- 
coming about the real reasons for their decisions if they are not 
consistent with the applicable rules or standards.i78 Thus, 
simple disagreement with the governing rule or standard 
should not be enough to trigger judicial activism to correct 
perceived injustices. 
- 
In the &ea of statutory interpretation, judges who follow a 
"weak" reading of Chevron may engage in judicial updating 
through a process of interpretive subterfuge.27g For some 
commentators, they assert that judges engage in judicial updat- 
ing of statutes while "shrouding their decisions in the rhetoric 
of originalist interpretati~n."~~' But perhaps as Professor 
Zeppos has observed, it is not so easy to  be critical of this type 
of judicial conduct.281 
274. Id. at 749-50. 
275. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 
519, 569 (1988). 
276. Shapiro, supra note 273, at 750. 
277. Id. 
278. But see Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial 
Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 672, 733 (1987) (opining that "a request for such candor probably 
asks too much of the judicial system"). See also Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 296, 297 (1990) (observing that "[landid opinions do not offer rea- 
sons judges know do not persuade them"). 
279. Zeppos, supra note 14, at  358-59 (noting that "complaints about the lack 
of candor also have a long tradition in the common lawn). 
280. Id. at 395. 
281. Professor Zeppos states: 
I t  is also possible that judges reach a result consistent with their person- 
al preferences but convince themselves that they have done no more than 
read the originalist evidence. Thus, if we asked these judges to be candid 
and to tell us their "real" reasons, they would look genuinely puzzled and 
point to their written opinions. Having persuaded themselves that they 
did not make policy, they would be incapable of candidly unmasking their 
originalist opinion. 
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The lack of candor, self-deception or, simply, a lack of self- 
awareness, in the Abourezk case comes as no surprise.2s2 But 
the fact that such lack of candor is commonplace should not 
prevent academics from engaging in a critical discourse about 
such judicial conduct, particularly in the area of statutory in- 
terpretation with its attendant concerns about legitimacy, in 
view of legislative supremacy. Such a critique is necessary t o  
prevent the abuse of judicial power.28s The problem of candor 
in judging is much more complex, however, than the discussion 
permits2LU and thus beyond the scope of this article. Although 
such conduct may be an unconscious form of judicial updating 
as some commentators have 0bserved,2~~ it remains, nonethe- 
less, a form of self-deception. 
One suspects that Judge Ginsburg simply disagreed with 
the government's position but felt constrained in rejecting it 
outright, thus the ordered remand.286 Given the fact that the 
activities in which the foreign nationals planned to engage 
included, among others, the delivery of speeches-activities 
that surely implicate the First Amendment-it is hard not to 
be suspicious of the Administration's motives in denying the 
visa requests. I suspect that the government was concerned 
that these particular aliens would be speaking to American 
groups and propounding a viewpoint considered embarrassing 
to  the United States or in some manner contrary to the best 
interests of United States foreign Because of the 
Id. at 409. Professor Zeppos opines ultimately that perhaps the problem isn't "so 
much a lack of candor . . . but [rather] a lack of self-awareness in judging." Id. at  
411. 
282. Id. at 402. 
283. Shapiro, supru note 273, at 736-37. Legal realists used to refer to this 
kind of judicial conduct as "judicial deception." See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND 40-41, 248-51 (1930). 
284. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 408. 
285. Id. at 410-11 (referring to Professor's Aleinikoff's nautical approach utiliz- 
ing originalist interpretive tools as judges unconsciously adopting judicial updating 
of statutes by reading them in a "present-minded" fashion). 
286. Of note, on remand the district court found the government's evidence of 
administrative practice and congressional acquiescence insufficient to support its 
construction of section 212(a)(27) to authorize exclusion on the basis of mere entry 
alone. Abourezk v. Reagap, Nos. 83-3739, 83-3895, 1988 US. Dist LEXIS 5203, at  
*8 (D.D.C. June 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. Ne). Again, the government 
took an appeal. Id. (appeal docketed, No. 88-5235 @.C. Cir. July 26, 1988)). 
287. Rick Atkinson, Congressmen, Others Denounce Denial of Visas to Critics of 
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overlap between foreign policy considerations and first amend- 
ment guarantees, suspicion would naturally attach to  any deni- 
al under subsection 27 rather than under subsection 28.288 
But these grounds of exclusion were not mutually exclusive. If 
a foreign visitor is excludable on one ground, she may also be 
excluded on any of the other grounds in the Act. So even 
though subsection 28, a waivable exclusion ground, was appli- 
cable in the Abourezk case, the alien could, nonetheless, have 
been excluded under subsection 27. 
A plausible explanation for the government's reluctance t o  
identify the reasons for denial on the basis of "activities"-as 
being prejudicial to the national interest-is sensitivity to the 
First Amendment concerns that would naturally arise.z8g 
Kindly put, such an interpretation does reflect the 
government's sensitivity to charges that it is attempting to  sup- 
press free exchange of ideas or  deprive these speakers of a 
United States audience. While one may deplore such conduct, it 
is well within the government's authority to  so legislate. Thus 
the government elected, arguably, to advance the interpretation 
that entry and mere presence was a sufficient basis for denial 
on foreign policy grounds in this case specifically to avoid rais- 
ing a constitutional, or more specifically, a disfavored policy 
issue. Although it is accepted doctrine that the government has 
the substantive power to deny entry on grounds that implicate 
first amendment guarantees, the district court judge would 
have found, nonetheless, such a reason for denial of the visas 
~bjectionbble.~~ 
U.S., THE WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1983, at A12. 
288. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 955, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1990). Therefore, 
the agency's practice may seem suspect. Legally speaking, however, it was not un- 
lawful or contrary to statutory authority to do so. 
289. 5 IMMIGRA~ON LAW REPORT 63 (1986). According to the author of the 
article in the Immigration Law Report, "[tlhis Administration's sensitivity to the 
issue . . . is symptomatic of the real problems underlying both 8 212(a)(27) and 
(a)(28)." Id. The author also opined that proposals then pending in Congress would 
have amended these former grounds for exclusion to assure their application only 
in cases in which the national security is involved, "a standard much more in 
keeping with American political values and foreign policy principles, insofar as 
those principles seek to encourage democratic traditions and institutions abroad." 
Id. As discussed above, this is apparently what Congress has done. 
290. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 88687 (D.D.C. 1984) ("For al- 
though the government may deny entry to aliens altogether, or for any number of 
specific reasons, it may not, consistent with the First Amendment, deny entry 
solely on account of the content of speech."). As a precautionary note, the district 
court later remarked: 
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Another reason which the government has steadfastly held 
to is the distinction drawn between visa denials based on orga- 
nizational associations and those relating to governmental 
associations. In Abourezk all visa applicants had governmental 
contacts, according to DOS officials. As such, the denials under 
these circumstances are entirely plausible despite the literal 
language which seems to cast a much narrower net of exclu- 
sion. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have upheld the 
lower court's finding on this issue unless the appellate court 
found the finding clearly erroneous.291 Of course, one recog- 
nizes the difficulty inherent in making this determination with- 
out evidence in the record-and none exists on this point for 
purposes of review-in light of the in camera proceedings in the 
district court. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals should have 
addressed the issue of resolving such disputes by way of in 
camera proceedings instead of going off on its own frolic and 
detour. 
As a practical matter, judges are no different than anyone 
else. Thus, application of governing legal doctrine is not the 
only influence on judicial decision-making. When faced with 
two or more legitimate dispositions in deciding a particular 
case, they are likely to  choose the one that is most consistent 
with their political views or philosophies on the interpretation 
and application of the law or policy. One commentator has 
aptly described these factors as external.292 
To find the conclusory statement that the entry of a particular individual 
would be contrary to United States foreign policy objectives to be a "fa- 
cially legitimate" reason would be to surrender to the Executive total 
discretion even in cases such as these where it is claimed-and the claim 
is not implausible-that entry is being denied solely on account of the 
content of the alien's proposed speech. 
Id. at 888. 
291. Although the majority seemed highly critical of the district court's han- 
dling of this matter in camera, under the circumstances it seemed to be the best 
approach. It served a supervisory function as well. As the district court remarked: 
Moreover, judicial scrutiny of the specific reasons for denials of entry will 
have the beneficial effect of preventing both a mushrooming of exclusions 
based on the provision here at issue and content-based denials. 
Id. at 888 (footnotes omitted). 
292. According to Professor Stephen Legomsky, one can apply to the immigra- 
tion cases "the increasingly well accepted view that various factors not typically 
acknowledged in courts' opinions contribute heavily to the results." STEPHEN 
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRFTAXN AND 
AMERICA 225 (1987). Among the "external" factors that influence judicial decision- 
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That fkeedom, though broad, is not limitless.293 The flexi- 
bility inherent in the judicial process is constrained by the now 
familiar "steadying factors" that Karl Llewellyn assembled as a 
response to  what he perceived as the excesses of legal realism. 
The Chevron mandate requires agency deference in appropriate 
cases. When such a case presents itself, the judge's focus is on 
determining whether the agency's construction is a reasonable 
one. Like the earlier articulated "steadying factors," consider- 
ation of reasonableness is another approach that functions as a 
constraint on judicial decisionmaking. But "probably the most 
si@icant of those constraints is the professional office occu- 
pied by the judge."294 
Thus, in examining an opinion of a judge in an immigra- 
tion case, one must factor into the discussion the limitations 
inherent in the law.295 Indeed, most commentators writing in 
this area believe, whether so stated or not, that judges should 
be more activist-oriented given the constraints already inherent 
in the law.296 Then add to these constraints the notion that 
as a matter of principle courts should defer to  an agency inter- 
pretation, it is not surprising that judges influenced by ideolog- 
ical forces will strain to fmd a way around such a principle.297 
making in the immigration sphere are: 
the personal backgrounds and political attitudes of the judges; the judges' 
own perceptions of their roles in the legal system; and the political forc- 
es-'political' here being used in its broadest sense to encompass social 
and economic forces as well-prevailing in society at  the time cases are 
decided. 
Id. 
293. Id. at 224. 
294. Id. (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING AP- 
PEALS 45-46 (1960)). 
295. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVO- 
LUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 212 n.10 (1991) ("Bent upon relieving the harsh- 
neqs of deportation orders, appellate judges have consistently distorted the immi- 
gration laws."). 
296. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 32, at  455 ("The law is well-known for the 
considerable discretion delegated to the Attorney General over many immigration 
decisions, discretion that is equalled in few administrative schemes."). 
297. See generally  ROBE^ H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITI- 
CAI, SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 52-129 (1990) (discussing such ideological factors). But 
cf. P. Irons, Making Law: The Case for Judicial Activism, 24 VALPARAISO U. L. 
REV. 35, 37 (1989) (remarking that "we need the weapon of judicial activism in 
order to p r o w  members of "discrete and insular" minorities from the tyranny of 
the majority"); Johnson, supm note 32, at 419 ("Because the INS has demonstrated 
an anti-immigrant, pro-enforcement bias, and because the executive branch has 
tremendous leeway in the foreign policy realm, deference is ill-advised in the immi- 
gration context."). 
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The most likely explanation for any individual decision, 
therefore, is the specific legal doctrine articulated in the opin- 
ion. At the outset, a court's refusal to  interfere with Congress 
on the issue of immigration results from the impact of the 
plenary power decisions.298 These decisions were accompanied 
by reasoned opinions. Then add to the mix a decision controlled 
by a statute, a limiting factor in judicial decision-making be- 
cause the legislature is the superior law-making body in this 
situation.299 And judges, for the most part, adhere to  the doc- 
trine of legislative supremacy in deciding such cases.3w A fur- 
ther limiting factor is judicial deference to an agency's inter- 
pretation of a statute which Congress has delegated to it to  
implement and administer. Such deference is lacking in the 
majority's opinion. 
B. Agency Deference 
Judge Bork's approach t o  deciding this case was consistent 
with judicial deference to an agency interpretation that was, 
arguably as previously discussed, reasonable under the circum- 
s tance~ .~~ '  But the emphasis on the legislative history as sup- 
porting this interpretation is misplaced. As discussed earlier, 
the evidence in the legislative history "tugged in both direc- 
tions." Nonetheless, the result was consistent with the Chevron 
mandate because the central question was the reasonableness 
of the agency's construction. Given that the legislative history 
did not preclude such an interpretation, that should have been 
the end of the discussion on that point. 
The Supreme Court has always said (e.g., Fiallo v. Bell) 
that it is for Congress and not the courts to  decide this nation's 
immigration policy. If we are afraid to hear what others have 
to  say then it's a sad commentary on our society. But we as a 
298. Peter Schuck states: 
For almost a century, the Supreme Court has treated immigration law 
as sui generis. It has bestowed upon Congress the untrammeled authority 
to make decisions concerning the admission and expulsion of aliens. So 
great has been the power of the word "immigration" that its mere men- 
tion has been enough to propel the Court into a cataleptic trance. 
Schuck, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
299. REYNOLDS, supra note 62, at 184. 
300. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Su- 
premacy, 78 GEo. LJ. 281 (1989) with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legisla- 
tive Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ.  319 (1989). 
301. See Pierce, supra note 232, at 308. 
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people, through the electorate, not the judiciary, make such 
choices. And because agencies are likely to be more accountable 
to  the electorate (as expressed by who is elected as President) 
than the courts, agencies should have the dominant role in 
matters of Moreover, Congress is the most appropri- 
ate arena for this discussion given all the political patticipants, 
i.e., congresspeople, staffers, lobbyists, and agency officials. 
Also, the efforts of the judiciary in such cases as Abourezk and 
Allende cannot substitute for congressional attention to this is- 
sue, and in fact are likely to create more problems than they 
solve as they strain for interpretations of the immigration stat- 
ute that may have unintended consequences.303 
In general, when the legislature has chosen to  work 
through an administrative agency to  realize its purposes, and 
therefore, presumptively, to confer on it some policy-making 
function, deference to the agency's construction of the statute 
should normally be permitted to function unless the judge is 
convinced that the purpose of the statute is contradicted. In 
this case, there appears to  be no significant evidence of such a 
contradiction. 
Professor Kenneth Davis argues that courts are the experts 
"on many types of issues, including constitutional law, common 
law, ethics, overall philosophy of law and government, proce- 
dural fairness, judge-made law developed through statutory 
interpretation, most analysis of legislative history, and prob- 
lems transcending the field of the particular agency."304 As 
for ascertaining a statute's meaning, according to  Professor 
Diver, "[tlhe conventional wisdom . . . favors agen~ies."~" 
Moreover, agencies are more knowledgeable about the circum- 
stances surrounding a statute's enactment.306 Therefore, in 
appropriate circumstances, judges should be restrained in their 
decisionmaking to avoid policymaking under the guise of in- 
terpreting statutes.307 
In the administrative state, agencies should have the domi- 
nant role in policymaking when the choice is between agencies 
302. Id. at 307. 
303. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 124, at 811. 
304. 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISI'RATIVE LAW TREATISE 393 (2d ed. 1984). 
305. Diver, supra note 1, at 583. 
306. Id. at 575. 
307. Of note is the fad that Kenneth Davis had once predicted that "consider- 
able deviation from the doctrine . . . is likely" because Chevron's allocation of in- 
terpretive authority is "unnatural." Callahan, supra note 57, at 1295 11.102. 
204 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
and courts. Thus the central question of statutory interpreta- 
tion posed here is whether agencies or courts should have 
greater authority over the process of interpreting statutes.308 
And because statutory interpretation is not "a search for direct 
decision of precise questions [given that] Congress often doesn't 
foresee how its laws will be applied or what the particular 
circumstances will be,"309 the courts should defer in appropri- 
ate cases to  the agency's construction of a matter involving 
policy. 
Instead the Abourezk majority employed unduly restrictive 
approaches and other subterfuges in deciding this case, the 
fxst one being that this was a special circumstances case re- 
quiring the court to avoid a constitutional confrontation.310 
Since the Supreme Court had already decided the issue ad- 
versely to plaintiffs in an earlier case, no such confrontation 
existed. Thus, shrouding the case in terms of statutory inter- 
pretation was merely a mechanism for side-stepping an issue 
that had an easy answer. 
Although the statutory issues in Abourezk were fairly com- 
plex, the constitutional ones were not. Supreme Court prece- 
dent in this area is quite clear and ~onsistent.~" Thus the 
majority in this case had to decide against the government on 
the statutory issues. In doing so, the court focused on the 
statute's legislative history. This approach afforded more flexi- 
bility in terms of the result in this Also, the 
majority's reference to the sweeping authority of the presiden- 
tial proclamation as an added safety feature was equally disin- 
genuous given the result-oriented nature of the decision.313 
Furthermore, such a reference merely served to highlight the 
underlying political nature of the decision in question which 
should have pointed in the direction of allowing a "permissible" 
agency interpretation. And as discussed earlier, the govern- 
ment found it necessary to resort to this authority to deal with 
308. Diver, supra note 1, at 550-51. 
309. Zeppos, supra note 14, at 397 n.258 (citing Professor Sunstein's judicial 
panel comments). 
310. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
311. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see also Abourezk v. Rea- 
gan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 881 (D.D.C. 1984) (referring to the constitutional issue in 
this case as "relatively straightforward"). 
312. See, e.g., Larry Evans et al., Congressional Procedure and Statutory Inter- 
pretation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 239 n.4 (1993). 
313. Abourezk., 785 F.2d at 1049 n.2. 
1391 NATURE OF JUDICLAL DECISION-MAKING 205 
the particular individuals in the consolidated cases. Much of 
what transpired in this case subsequently was unnecessary. 
The problem remains and will unfortunately continue because 
the required deference to  agencies causes courts to  surrender 
too much control to agencies, particularly when reviewing deci- 
sions of those agencies popularly viewed as suspect. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Many theories of statutory interpretation are the subject of 
academic discourse in today's legal climate. But are any of 
them satisfactory for application in the administrative context? 
How well do the traditional tools really work in a case such as 
Abourezk? If you apply the plain meaning rule as would a 
textualist, the agency's interpretation falters. If you take a look 
at the legislative history as would a student of the legal process 
school, the issue of intent is inconclusive if not illusory. How- 
ever, taking everything into account as a modified 
intentionalist would, one could conclude that the agency's inter- 
pretation was permissible. This is particularly appropriate here 
because it is such a highly deferential area of the law notwith- 
standing its detractors' criticism. Further, this is a matter that 
goes to the very heart of how this nation defines itself, which is 
accomplished through the processes employed by the legislative 
and the executive branches of government. More importantly, 
this is all that the Chevron mandate requires under these par- 
ticular circumstances; namely, for the courts to ascertain the 
reasonableness of the agency's construction, not whether they 
would prefer something different, more enlightened or better. 
There is no question that a comprehensive revision of the 
national and security interests exclusion provisions was long 
overdue. Born of an era long since past, and made even more 
arcane with the recent fall of communism and the subsequent 
political re-alignments worldwide, it nonetheless remained for 
the political branches of government to  strike the appropriate 
agreement on the contours of the newly enacted provision re- 
placing subsection 27 and the surrounding political exclusion 
grounds. Although severely limited in its scope, Congress still 
accorded the executive branch explicit authority to  exclude 
aliens on the basis of foreign policy considerations. No doubt 
this is exactly what the courts were attempting to do. It is un- 
likely that any serious reform in this highly politicized area 
could have been achieved short of a new world order. Neverthe- 
less judicial intervention is not the answer. 
206 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REYIEW 11995 
As a matter of policy, the agency's construction in Abourezk 
was not unreasonable nor was it plainly inconsistent with other 
INA statutory provisions. Under Chevron, it was therefore a 
permissible construction that should have been given due defer- 
ence. It was not given such deference because the majority 
apparently seized the moment to, in effect, update the anachro- 
nistic provisions of this cold-war era statute or, at the very 
least, frustrate the modern-day agency's actions in barring the 
admission of undesirable foreign officials on foreign policy 
grounds that probably did not run afoul of first amendment 
implications. 
All of this is by no means to suggest that the courts do not 
play a role in the administrative context. The determination of 
whether an agency's construction is "permissible" or "reason- 
able," albeit a constraining factor in the judicial process, is not 
intended as an abdication of the judicial role in such matters. 
In the administrative state, courts play a primary and neces- 
sary role of supervision when judges scrutinize agency deci- 
sions and interpretations of statutes. As the nation's moral 
conscience, there is always a need for judicial scrutiny of agen- 
cy conduct, but given that certain doctrines, judicially-created 
no less, limit the role of the judiciary in certain areas of the 
law, legal reformists should look to more appropriate venues 
for their reform efforts.314 But alas, such is the nature of judi- 
cial decision-making that promotes the judicial route as the 
more appropriate avenue for achieving justice. 
314. See 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS AND RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 7 (3d ed. 1994) (opining that "[r]eviewing courts may have little 
choice but to tolerate less accuracy and greater discretion in the agency 
decisionmaking process" given the limited judicial resources and expanding admin- 
istrative workloads). 
